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Does Stare Decisis  
Preclude Reconsideration of Roe 
v. Wade? A Critique of Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey 
Paul Benjamin Linton† and Maura K. Quinlan†† 
Abstract 
 Will the Supreme Court overrule its landmark decision in Roe v. 
Wade? Recent judicial confirmation battles, political campaigns, and 
state legislation seem to be driven by this question. In Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, however, a majority of the Court held that the 
doctrine of stare decisis—the legal principle that courts should adhere 
to their prior precedents—precludes any reexamination of Roe. Based 
on stare decisis, Casey reaffirmed what it described as the central 
holding of Roe—that abortion could not be prohibited prior to viability, 
the stage in pregnancy when the unborn child could survive if born 
prematurely. 
 This Article examines the stare decisis analysis set forth in Casey 
and concludes that the Court’s analysis does not withstand scrutiny. 
Casey asserted that Roe’s selection of viability was well reasoned and 
“elaborated with great care,” but nothing in the Roe opinion itself 
supports that assertion. Indeed, Justice Blackmun’s own papers show 
that the choice of viability was completely arbitrary, an apparent after–
thought. Casey also claimed that the viability rule must be followed 
because four stare decisis factors had been met: the rule was “work–
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able,” people had come to “rely” on the availability of abortion, and no 
“changes in law” or “change of facts” undermined the choice of viability. 
 As this Article demonstrates, Casey’s stare decisis analysis is 
deficient on all four grounds. First, it is quite difficult to make an 
accurate determination of viability and there is no current medical 
consensus even as to what constitutes viability. Thus, the viability rule 
is unworkable because it is incapable of being applied and enforced in 
a principled, consistent fashion. Second, given the widespread avail–
ability of many highly effective forms of contraception, there is no 
plausible reliance interest in unrestricted abortion up until viability. 
Moreover, the social and economic progress that women have achieved 
cannot fairly be attributed to the availability of abortion on demand. 
Third, there have been substantial changes in criminal, tort, and health-
care law that now protect unborn children throughout pregnancy; 
changes that have discarded viability as an outmoded relic of legal 
analysis. This undermines Roe’s suggestion that the unborn need not 
be protected until after viability because they are not protected in other 
areas of law. Finally, many scientific and medical developments—most 
significantly ultrasound and fetal surgery—vividly demonstrate that 
unborn children are actually alive, thereby undermining Roe’s claim 
that the unborn represent only “potential” life. 
 Another case requesting that Roe be overruled is virtually certain 
to reach the Supreme Court. When that happens, the doctrine of stare 
decisis should not prevent the Court from reconsidering and overruling 
Roe. 
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Introduction 
Will the Supreme Court overrule Roe v. Wade, the 1973 decision 
that legalized abortion throughout the United States?1 The election of 
Donald Trump as president on November 8, 2016, has fueled spec–
ulation that he would have the opportunity to appoint enough justices 
to create a majority on the Court that would reconsider and overrule 
Roe.2 Whether President Trump’s appointments, along with the other 
justices on the Court who are (or who are believed to be) opposed to 
the landmark decision, would actually vote to overrule Roe remains to 
be seen. But even if a majority of Supreme Court justices were con–
vinced that Roe v. Wade was wrongly decided as an original matter, 
should the Court overrule Roe? Or, as in Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,3 should the justices feel bound to 
reaffirm Roe on the basis of stare decisis, the legal principle that courts 
should not disturb their own precedents? That is the subject of this 
Article. 
I. The Doctrine of Stare Decisis 
The term stare decisis is part of a longer Latin phrase, stare decisis 
et non quieta movere, which means “to adhere to precedents, and not 
to unsettle things that are established.”4 As a general principle, stare 
decisis “is the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, 
predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters 
reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and per–
 
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
2. This speculation is not unreasonable, given the vacancy created by the 
death of Justice Scalia earlier in 2016, which had not been filled before 
the election, the ages of several of the justices at the time of the election, 
and President Trump’s well-known views regarding abortion.  
3. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
4. Stare decisis, Black’s Law Dictionary 1220 (10th ed. 2014). 
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ceived integrity of the judicial process.”5 The Court will not overturn a 
past decision unless there are strong reasons for doing so.6 But, as the 
Court has frequently recognized, stare decisis is “not an inexorable 
command.”7 Rather, it “is a principle of policy and not a mechanical 
formula of adherence to the latest decision.”8 And stare decisis “is at 
its weakest when [the Court] interpret[s] the Constitution because [its] 
interpretation can be altered only by constitutional amendment or by 
overruling [its] prior decisions.”9 
The Supreme Court considers different factors in deciding whether 
to overrule a past precedent.10 Obviously, the Court does not need to 
consider those factors unless it has come to the conclusion that the 
precedent under review was wrongly decided. For purposes of this 
Article, we shall assume that a majority of the Supreme Court (the 
present Court or a future Court) has concluded that Roe v. Wade was 
wrongly decided as an original matter of constitutional interpretation. 
Before examining Casey’s analysis of the factors that need to be 
considered in deciding whether a precedent should be overruled, 
 
5. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991). 
6. See, e.g., United States v. IBM Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 856 (1996). 
7. Payne, 501 U.S. at 828. 
8. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940). 
9. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997). As Professor Paulsen has 
persuasively argued: 
[T]he doctrine of stare decisis is not constitutionally required, in 
any sense, and has never been so understood. Nothing in Article 
III of the Constitution (or in any other provision of the Constitution) 
mandates a practice of adherence to precedent; nothing in Article 
III specifies any rule or set of criteria for when a court should, 
must, or may follow a prior decision.  
 Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Supreme Court’s Current Doctrine of 
Stare Decisis Require Adherence to the Supreme Court’s Current Doctrine 
of Stare Decisis?, 86 N.C. L. Rev. 1165, 1169 (2008). Professor Paulsen’s 
article provides a thought provoking critique of Casey’s analysis of stare 
decisis in general terms, not as applied to the specific issue of abortion, 
which is the subject of this Article. 
10. For example, when overruling Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 
209 (1977), the Court in Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, County, & Mun. 
Employees, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) considered “the quality of Abood’s 
reasoning, the workability of the rule it established, its consistency with 
other related decisions, developments since the decision was handed down, 
and reliance on the decision.” Id. at 2478–79. The “quality” of Roe’s 
reasoning, in recognizing a right to abortion, largely lies outside the scope 
of this Article, which focuses on Casey’s stare decisis analysis. Never–
theless, it must be noted that Roe has been subjected to severe and 
sustained scholarly attack since it was decided in 1973. See infra note 199 
and accompanying text. 
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however, it is important to note the significant respects in which 
Casey’s joint opinion (hereinafter Joint Opinion) departed from the 
reasoning and holdings of Roe. And there are many. That, in turn, 
suggests that the Court’s resort to stare decisis as the critical 
justification for “reaffirming” Roe was, at best, pretextual.11 
II. What the Joint Opinion in Casey Left Behind on the 
Side of the Road 
While purporting to rely on the doctrine of stare decisis to reaffirm 
Roe, the Joint Opinion abandoned major aspects of Roe and Roe’s 
progeny. Very briefly, the most significant discarded aspects of Roe are 
as follows. 
First, Roe divided pregnancy into trimesters and determined to 
what extent the State may regulate or prohibit abortion at each stage.12 
The Joint Opinion rejected Roe’s trimester framework and divided 
pregnancy into two stages for purposes of its analysis—pre- and post-
viability.13 
Second, Roe effectively employed the “strict scrutiny” standard of 
judicial review, under which only the least restrictive means of pro–
moting a compelling state interest would support interference with a 
woman’s right to choose abortion.14 The Joint Opinion rejected this 
standard, and substituted an “undue burden” standard of review in 
place of Roe’s strict-scrutiny standard. 15  Under the new Casey 
standard, regulations that do not prohibit abortion or impose an “undue 
burden” on a woman’s ability to obtain an abortion before viability 
need only be “reasonably related” to the State’s legitimate interests in 
 
11. As Chief Justice Rehnquist stated in his partial dissent, the Court’s 
discussion of the principle of stare decisis “appears to be almost entirely 
dicta, because the joint opinion does not apply that principle in dealing 
with Roe.” Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833, 954 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
12. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162–65 (1973). 
13. Casey, 505 U.S. at 872–79. 
14. Roe, 410 U.S. at 155. Roe described the right to choose abortion as 
“fundamental,” id. at 152–53, and identified state interests in preserving 
maternal health and protecting the “potentiality of human life,” as 
becoming “compelling” (and therefore weighty enough to support regulation 
and even prohibition of abortion) at different stages of pregnancy, id. at 
162–64. Finally, Roe held that regulations limiting the exercise of the 
abortion liberty had to be “narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate 
state interests at stake.” Id. at 155. 
15. Casey, 505 U.S. at 874–79. 
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protecting maternal health or prenatal life.16 And a regulation would 
not be considered to impose an undue burden unless it had the 
“purpose” or “effect” of placing a “substantial obstacle” in the path of 
a woman seeking an abortion before viability.17 
Third, the Joint Opinion expressly overruled, in part, two of the 
Court’s prior decisions that had applied the Roe standard of review to 
state regulations governing all abortions, regardless of the stage of 
pregnancy.18 In those decisions, the Court had found the regulations 
invalid under Roe’s trimester framework. According to the Joint 
Opinion, portions of those two decisions needed to be overruled because 
the trimester framework was no longer applicable and they were 
incompatible with the Court’s newly minted undue-burden standard of 
review.19 
Given the Joint Opinion’s wholesale abandonment of major aspects 
of Roe, it is difficult to take seriously its pronouncements on the 
importance of adhering to precedent. 20  The authors of the Joint 
Opinion, however, tried to finesse this difficulty by repeatedly referring 
to the viability rule as the “central”21 or “essential”22 holding of Roe, 
and “reject[ing] the trimester framework, which we do not consider to 
be part of the essential holding of Roe.”23 By characterizing the viability 
rule as “central” and “essential,” the Joint Opinion in effect dismissed 
the rest of the trimester structure as “peripheral” and “superfluous.” 
But the centrality of the trimester framework to Roe’s analysis cannot 
be so easily dismissed. 
 
16. See id. at 877–78. Unlike Roe, the Joint Opinion in Casey never 
characterized the nature of the right at all and merely described the state 
interests as “legitimate” and “substantial.” See id. at 846, 853, 871–73, 
876. Nor did the Joint Opinion adopt the narrowly drawn (least-restrictive 
means) language of Roe. See id. 
17. See id. at 877.  
18. Id. at 870, 881–87 (overruling, in part, City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for 
Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 444–45 (1983), and Thornburgh v. 
Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 759–64 (1986)). 
19. Id. at 883, 885–87 (holding that neither the informed-consent requirement 
nor the twenty-four-hour waiting period imposed an “undue burden” on 
a woman’s ability to obtain an abortion). 
20. “The end result of the joint opinion’s paeans of praise for legitimacy is 
the enunciation of a brand-new standard for evaluating state regulation 
of a woman’s right to abortion—the ‘undue burden’ standard.” Id. at 964 
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
21. The Joint Opinion referred to the viability rule as the “central” holding 
of Roe almost two dozen times. Id. at 845–46, 853, 855, 857–58, 860–61, 
864–65, 870–71, 873, 878–79. 
22. Id. at 845–46, 869–71, 873, 880. 
23. Id. at 873. 
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In summarizing its holdings in Roe, the Court specifically reiterated 
the trimester framework,24 thereby reinforcing its importance. There is 
no reason, then, to believe that the Roe Court regarded any one element 
of that trimester framework as more important than any other. 25 
Moreover, to the extent that an undue-burden standard of review 
previously had been suggested to replace the Roe strict scrutiny 
standard, it was the undue-burden standard that Justice O’Connor first 
articulated in her dissent in City of Akron v. Akron Center for 
Reproductive Health, Inc.,26 and then favorably cited in her concurring 
opinion in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services. 27  The Joint 
Opinion, however, did not retain the undue-burden standard in the 
same form as Justice O’Connor had explained it in her earlier opinions. 
Instead, the Joint Opinion (which Justice O’Connor co-authored), 
adopted a much narrower and more unwieldy version.28 
 
24. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1973). 
25. As Justice Scalia said in his partial dissent, “I must . . . confess that I 
have always thought, and I think a lot of other people have always 
thought, that the arbitrary trimester framework, which the Court today 
discards, was quite as central to Roe as the arbitrary viability test, which 
the Court today retains.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 993 (Scalia, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
26. 462 U.S. 416, 461–65 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).  
27. 492 U.S. 490, 529–31 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
28. There are two critical differences between Justice O’Connor’s earlier 
formulation of the undue-burden standard and the Joint Opinion’s 
formulation. First, in Justice O’Connor’s earlier opinions, she strongly 
implied that a statute creates an undue burden only if it imposes “absolute 
obstacles or severe limitations on the abortion decision.” Akron Ctr., 462 
U.S. at 464 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Under the Joint 
Opinion’s reformulation of this standard, an undue burden exists even if 
the statute imposes only a “substantial” obstacle to the effectuation of 
the abortion decision. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846, 877–95, 901. Second, in her 
earlier opinions, Justice O’Connor expressed the view that a regulation of 
abortion that does impose an undue burden may be upheld if it either 
“reasonably relate[s] to the preservation and protection of maternal 
health,” Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 
462 U.S. 476, 505 (1983) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 163), or “reasonably relates” to “the 
State’s compelling interests in maternal physical and mental health and 
protection of fetal life,” Akron Ctr., 462 U.S. at 473–74 (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting). See also Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & 
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 828 (1986) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Under 
the Joint Opinion’s reformulation, however, undue burdens imposed 
before viability are never constitutional. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877. 
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In light of the Joint Opinion’s “selective disdain for precedent,”29 it 
is hard to disagree with Chief Justice Rehnquist’s critique of the Joint 
Opinion’s treatment of the principle of stare decisis: 
Whatever the “central holding” of Roe that is left after the joint 
opinion finishes dissecting it is surely not the result of that 
principle. While purporting to adhere to precedent, the joint 
opinion instead revises it. Roe continues to exist, but only in the 
way a storefront on a western movie set exists: a mere facade to 
give the illusion of reality.30  
And, as Part III of this Article demonstrates, the Joint Opinion’s 
attempt to explain why the doctrine of stare decisis precludes 
reconsideration of Roe’s central holding—that the states may not 
prohibit abortion before viability or place a substantial obstacle in the 
path of a woman seeking a pre-viability abortion—fares no better. It, 
too, is “a mere facade to give the illusion of reality.”31 
III. Critique of the Stare Decisis Factors Identified in 
Casey 
At the outset of its stare decisis discussion, the Joint Opinion states 
that Roe’s selection of viability as the stage in pregnancy when the 
State may prohibit abortion was “a reasoned statement, elaborated 
with great care,” and “twice reaffirmed.”32 However, Roe’s explication 
of its selection of viability as the critical point upon which to balance 
the competing interests of a pregnant woman’s right to abortion and 
the State’s right to protect prenatal life was superficial and conclusory. 
In fact, the Court’s entire “elaboration” of its reasoning consists of three 
bald assertions—not one of which is supported by any explanation. 
First, the Court asserted that the State’s interest in protecting 
prenatal life “grows in substantiality as the woman approaches term 
and, at a point during pregnancy, . . . becomes ‘compelling.’”33 The 
Court provided no explanation as to why the State’s interest in 
protecting human life should grow substantially as the unborn child 
 
29. Michael P. Gerhardt, The Pressure of Precedent, A Critique of the 
Conservative Approaches to Stare Decisis in Abortion Cases, 10 Const. 
Commentary 67, 77 (1993). 
30. Casey, 505 U.S. at 954 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
31. See id.  
32. Id. at 870 (referring to Akron Ctr., 462 U.S. at 419–20, and Thornburgh, 
476 U.S. at 759). 
33. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162–63 (1973). 
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grows and develops during the pregnancy.34 Certainly, a state’s interest 
in protecting the life of a newborn baby is no less than its interest in 
protecting the life of a toddler, a teenager or an adult. An unborn child, 
like a newborn, is on a continuum toward adulthood. The State’s 
interest in protecting both is the same. 
The next assertion made in Roe was that “the ‘compelling’ point is 
at viability,” “because the fetus then presumably has the capability of 
meaningful life outside the mother’s womb.” 35  Again, there is no 
explanation of why the capability of “meaningful life” (whatever that 
may mean) outside the womb should mark the time at which a state 
may protect prenatal life.36 
Finally, the Court asserted that “State regulation protective of fetal 
life after viability thus has both logical and biological justifications,”37 
but did not attempt to explain these justifications. Indeed, there is a 
certain illogic in the notion that the State should be able to protect 
prenatal life by prohibiting abortion only after viability (when the 
unborn child could live independently and is least in need of protection), 
but not before viability (when the unborn child is most vulnerable). 
Likewise, there is little, if any, biological justification for choosing 
viability as the point when the State’s interest in protecting fetal life 
becomes compelling. A twenty-three-week-old unborn child who would 
be viable today is no different than a twenty-three-week-old unborn 
child who would not have been viable in 1973.38 There is simply no 
intrinsic biological difference between these two children. 
 
34. To the extent that the Court was suggesting that an unborn child is only 
“potential” life and not actually alive within the womb, its acknowledg–
ment of the fact that the child is growing and developing as the woman 
progresses toward term would seem to belie that suggestion. See infra 
Part III.D.2. 
35. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. As Dean Ely noted at the time, the Court’s 
explanation for choosing viability “mistakes a definition for a syllogism.” 
John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Commentary on Roe v. 
Wade, 82 Yale L.J. 920, 924 (1973). 
36. Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion in Thornburgh, tried to provide 
a justification for why the State would have a greater interest in protecting 
unborn human life later in pregnancy than earlier, saying that it is 
“obvious that the State’s interest . . . increases progressively and 
dramatically as the organism’s capacity to feel pain, to experience 
pleasure, to survive, and to react to its surroundings increases day by 
day.” Id. at 778 (Stevens, J., concurring). This is not at all “obvious,” 
however, for it suggests that the State’s interest in protecting the life of 
the newborn or the mentally disabled would be less than its interest in 
protecting the life of competent adults, a notion that is clearly contrary 
to our existing laws and principles of equality under the law. 
37. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. 
38. Although, at the time Roe was decided, a twenty-three-week-old unborn 
child would not have been considered to be viable, now that child could 
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It is not surprising that Roe is so devoid of any relevant discussion 
or explanation of its choice of viability for balancing the competing 
interests of the parties. None of the statutes challenged in Roe or its 
companion case, Doe v. Bolton,39 made any distinction based upon 
viability, and the concept of viability was not briefed or argued by any 
of the parties (or their amici) in either case. Appellants argued that a 
woman has an “absolute right” to abortion throughout her pregnancy, 
while appellees argued that the State could “protect prenatal life from 
and after conception.”40 None of the justices raised the issue of viability 
at oral argument.41 
The second draft of Justice Blackmun’s opinion in Roe was 
circulated six weeks after Roe and Doe had been reargued. That draft 
stated that the State’s “important and legitimate interest in the 
potentiality of human life . . . becomes ‘compelling,’” and therefore 
strong enough to support a restriction of abortion, “at, or at any time 
after the end of the first trimester, as the State may determine.”42 That 
draft did not say after viability. In his cover letter accompanying that 
draft, Justice Blackmun said, “You will observe that I have concluded 
that the end of the first trimester is critical. This is arbitrary, but 
perhaps any other selected point, such as quickening or viability, is 
equally arbitrary.”43 
 
be considered to be viable. See, e.g., Carl H. Backes et al., Outcomes 
Following a Comprehensive Versus a Selective Approach for Infants Born 
at 22 Weeks of Gestation, 39 J. Perinatology 39, 45 (2019). 
39. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
40. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 156. 
41. The audio recordings and transcripts of the oral arguments in Roe v. 
Wade and Doe v. Bolton may be found at https//www.oyez.org/cases/ 
 1971/70-18 (last visited Feb. 1, 2020) and https/www.oyez.org/cases/1971/ 
 70-40 (last visited Feb. 1, 2020), respectively. 
42. Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Unpublished Second Draft Opinion in Roe v. 
Wade, No. 70-18, at 47-48 (Nov. 22, 1972) (on file with Library of 
Congress, Manuscript Division, Box 151, Folder 6, Harry A. Blackmun 
Papers) (emphasis added). “For the stage subsequent to the first trimester, 
the State may, if it chooses, determine a point beyond which it restricts 
legal abortions to stated reasonable therapeutic categories that are articulated 
with sufficient clarity so that a physician is able to predict what conditions 
fall within the stated classification.” Id. at 48. 
43. Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Memorandum to the Conference, Re: No. 70-
18—Roe v. Wade (Nov. 21, 1972) (emphasis added) (on file at Library of 
Congress, Manuscript Division, Box 151, Folder 6, Harry A. Blackmun 
Papers), available at Blackmun Memorandum on Roe v. Wade, Just 
Facts, https://www.justfacts.com/abortion.blackmun.asp [https://perma 
 .cc/3PTB-L2L8] (last visited Oct. 9, 2019). “Quickening” is that stage of 
fetal development when the mother first detects fetal movement, usually 
beginning around the sixteenth week of pregnancy. See Quickening, 
Dorland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary 1567 (32nd ed. 2012). 
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It is not entirely clear what influenced Justice Blackmun’s thinking 
in subsequently abandoning the end of the first trimester as the critical 
period of time in favor of viability.44 However, it is clear that the 
authors of the Joint Opinion in Casey were seriously mistaken in 
asserting that, with respect to the selection of viability, the opinion in 
Roe “was a reasoned statement, elaborated with great care.”45 Although 
the majority opinions in Akron Center and Thornburgh v. American 
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists46 did reaffirm Roe (on the 
basis of stare decisis), neither opinion defended or even mentioned the 
rationale upon which the choice of viability had been made.47 
The Four Stare Decisis Factors 
 The Joint Opinion in Casey identified four factors that need to be 
evaluated in determining whether the doctrine of stare decisis bars 
reconsideration of a rule of law adopted in an earlier precedent. Those 
factors were:  
[(1)] whether the rule has proven to be intolerable simply in 
defying practical workability, [(2)] whether the rule is subject to 
a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the 
consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of 
repudiation, [(3)] whether related principles of law have so far 
developed as to have left the old rule no more than a remnant of 
abandoned doctrine, [and (4)] whether facts have so changed, or 
come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of 
significant application or justification.48  
We shall refer to these four factors as “workability,” “reliance,” “change 
in law,” and “changes of fact.” 
 
44. After a meticulous examination of the Court’s internal papers, one scholar 
has concluded that the only reason Justice Blackmun “expanded abortion 
to fetal viability” was a “pragmatic” one, specifically, “a broader ‘right’ 
to abortion would mean more access for more abortions.” Clarke D. 
Forsythe, Abuse of Discretion: The Inside Story of Roe v. Wade 
153 (2013). 
45. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
870 (1992). 
46. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).  
47. See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 
416, 419–20 (1983); Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 759. 
48. Casey, 505 U.S. at 854–55 (citations omitted). 
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A. Workability 
The first stare decisis factor identified in Casey is whether the 
viability rule has proven to be “unworkable” in practice.49 The Joint 
Opinion dismissed any concerns over this factor in a single sentence, 
merely remarking that Roe represents “a simple limitation beyond 
which a state law is unenforceable.”50 It also stated that although the 
need for continued judicial assessment of state abortion laws would 
remain, “the required determinations fall within judicial competence.”51 
The Court did not explain the underlying basis for either statement. 
The Joint Opinion’s failure to develop those points is astonishing, 
given the prior opinions of two of its three authors. In her dissent in 
Thornburgh, Justice O’Connor stated that the “Court’s abortion 
decisions have already worked a major distortion in the Court’s consti–
tutional jurisprudence.”52 She continued: “That the Court’s unworkable 
scheme for constitutionalizing the regulation of abortion has had this 
institutionally debilitating effect should not be surprising, however, 
since the Court is not suited to the expansive role it has claimed for 
itself in the series of cases that began with Roe v. Wade.”53 In Akron 
Center, Justice O’Connor’s dissent provided a lengthy criticism of Roe’s 
requirement that States continuously update their statutes to assure 
that they do not “depart from accepted medical practice.”54 While 
noting that this was a difficult and “exacting task” for legislatures, she 
stated that legislatures are far more competent “to make the necessary 
judgments than are courts.”55 Finally, Justice O'Connor correctly desc–
ribed Roe’s framework as it relates to maternal health and fetal 
viability, as “on a collision course with itself.”56  
 
49. Id. at 855.  
50. Id.  
51. Id. 
52. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 814 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
53. Id. at 814–15; see also City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 
Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 453–54 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) 
(describing Roe’s entire trimester framework, including viability, as 
“completely unworkable” and urging that it be scrapped). 
54. Akron Ctr., 462 U.S. at 454 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 431 
(majority opinion)).  
55. Id. at 456 & n.4. 
56. See id. at 458. Justice O’Connor argued that as abortion becomes safer 
later in pregnancy and viability is achieved earlier in pregnancy a woman’s 
absolute right to obtain an abortion whenever it is safer than childbirth 
would collide with the State’s right to protect prenatal life when viable. 
Id. at 456–58. Some medical sources currently claim that abortion is safer 
than childbirth throughout pregnancy. See, e.g., Elizabeth G. Raymond 
& David A. Grimes, The Comparative Safety of Legal Induced Abortion 
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Justice Kennedy, for his part, joined Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
plurality opinion in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,57 stating 
that principles of stare decisis should not prevent reconsideration of 
Roe because Roe “has proved ‘unsound in principle and unworkable in 
practice.’”58 The Joint Opinion failed to acknowledge these pronoun–
cements that Roe is unworkable, much less explain what supposedly 
changed the justices’ minds. Instead, without any explanation or 
elaboration, the Joint Opinion cited Garcia v. San Antonio Metro–
politan Transit Authority,59 as though simply citing Garcia was self-
explanatory. It is not.60 
In Garcia, the Supreme Court determined that its prior holding in 
National League of Cities v. Usery61 should be overturned because the 
Court’s attempt in Usery to distinguish between “proprietary” and 
“traditional” functions of state and local government was “unsound in 
principle and unworkable in practice.”62 As Garcia explained, it is not 
sufficient to simply state “that a ‘line [must] be drawn,’ and proceed[] 
to draw that line.”63 For stare decisis to apply, the Court must give a 
“reasoned explanation” for drawing that line. 64  The Casey Joint 
Opinion conspicuously failed to give that explanation. The Joint 
Opinion determined that a line must be drawn and “conclude[d] the 
line should be drawn at viability.”65 But it offered no reasoned explan–
 
and Childbirth in the United States, 119 Obstetrics & Gynecology 
215, 215–19 (2012). 
57. 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
58. Id. at 518 (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 
528, 546 (1985)). 
59. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
60. Ironically, Webster and Casey cited the exact same page of Garcia for 
opposite propositions. In Webster, the plurality opinion cited Garcia in 
support of a finding that stare decisis would not preclude overturning 
Roe, while in Casey the Joint Opinion cited Garcia in support of a finding 
that stare decisis would preclude overturning Roe. Compare Webster, 492 
U.S. at 518, with Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992). 
61. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). In Usery, the Supreme Court held that, under the 
Tenth Amendment, the minimum wage and overtime regulations of the 
federal Fair Labor Standards Act could be applied only to “proprietary,” 
but not “traditional,” functions of state and local government. Id. at 852. 
This test was unworkable because it was difficult to determine which 
functions were proprietary and which were traditional. 
62. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546–47. 
63. Id. at 543 (first alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting South 
Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 456 (1905)). 
64. Id. 
65. Casey, 505 U.S. at 870. 
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ation for drawing that line.66 It simply stated, ipse dixit, that “there is 
no line other than viability which is more workable.”67 Thus we are 
told, in effect, that although the choice of viability may “appear 
arbitrary” and is not actually workable, the “viability line” must be 
reaffirmed because of stare decisis.68 
As set forth below, making a judgment with respect to viability is 
neither “simple” nor “within judicial competence” to determine. Nor is 
viability “more workable” than any other line. 
1. Viability is Not a “Simple Limitation” 
The Casey Court referred to viability as though it is a well-defined 
line (or point in time) that can be determined with some precision—a 
“simple limitation beyond which a state law is unenforceable.”69 There 
are many problems with the Court’s approach, not the least of which 
is that viability is not really a defined line at all. Rather, it is a 
prediction—an educated guess—about the statistical probability that a 
baby (given certain characteristics) has of surviving if born premat–
urely. This is a complex estimation made on the basis of assessing 
multiple factors. It usually is done in the context of managing a preg–
nancy at risk of premature birth or in the context of determining the 
type and amount of care to be provided to a baby that has already been 
born prematurely.70 And there is no predetermined degree of statistical 
probability that is generally accepted within the medical community 
regarding what constitutes viability. Different medical specialties, as 
well as individual physicians within those specialties, often have very 
different views about whether a baby with a statistical probability of 
 
66. It is clear that the Roe Court’s choice of viability (as the point when 
sufficient value could be assigned to the unborn child to allow limitations 
on the woman’s ability to obtain an abortion) was completely arbitrary. 
See supra notes 40–44 and accompanying text. As such, it simply 
represents a value judgment made by the members of the Court based 
upon their own personal predilections. 
67. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 870. 
68. See id. 
69. Id. at 855. 
70. All of the medical journal articles discussed herein assess viability in these 
two contexts. We were unable to find any medical journal articles or 
abortion industry standards discussing viability predictions in the context 
of abortion. This is not surprising given that, in the context of abortion, 
the Court has held that the viability determination must be left solely to 
the judgment of the physician performing the abortion on a case-by-case 
basis. See Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 
52, 63–65 (1976); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395–97 (1979). 
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survival of, say 20 percent, is viable.71 Thus, the “viability line,”72 as 
the Court refers to it, is no line at all. It is an illusion. 
2. Factors Affecting Viability 
Viability is currently predicted by examining a variety of factors, 
which are of varying difficulty to determine. Some factors are intrinsic 
to the baby—his or her gestational age,73 weight, sex (females fare 
better than males),74 and whether there is a singleton or multiple birth 
(singletons do better). 75  But each of these factors has significant 
limitations with respect to accuracy of determination, especially during 
pregnancy. Take, for example, gestational age. There are three basic 
methods that have been relied upon since Roe and Coluatti for 
determining an unborn child’s gestational age. The two primary 
methods used at the time of Roe were determinations based on a 
physical examination of the pregnant woman and/or her recollection of 
the first day of her last menstrual period (“LMP”). Both of these 
methods are notoriously inaccurate means of determining gestational 
age.76 
 
71. See Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists & Soc’y for 
Maternal-Fetal Med., Obstetric Care Consensus: Periviable Birth, 
130 Obstetrics & Gynecology e187, e195 (Oct. 2017) (suggesting that 
individual institutions should develop consensus guidelines because 
various providers may “have divergent opinions and practices based on 
personal beliefs or professional experiences”). Periviable birth is defined 
as a “delivery occurring from 20 0/7 weeks to 25 6/7 weeks of gestation.” 
Id. at e188. 
72. Casey, 505 U.S. at 870.  
73. Gestational age is determined from the first day of the woman’s last 
menstrual period, see Gestation, Black’s Medical Dictionary 529 (43rd 
ed. 2012), and is commonly used by both obstetricians and neonatologists. 
Accordingly, we use that term throughout this Article. 
74. The National Institute of Child Health & Human Development’s 
(NICHD) preterm-birth-outcome calculator provides predicted survival 
rates for babies between twenty-two and twenty-five weeks. NICHD 
Neonatal Research Network (NRN): Extremely Preterm Birth Outcome 
Data, Nat’l Inst. of Health, https://www1.nichd.nih.gov/epbo-calculator/ 
 Pages/epbo_case.aspx [https://perma.cc/79RM-J9C7] [hereinafter NICHD] 
(last reviewed Dec. 12, 2019). Inputting identical data into that calculator 
results in roughly a 10 percent reduction in survival rates between twenty-
three and twenty-five weeks for males when the sex is changed from female 
to male. See id. Though males still fare worse than females at twenty-two 
weeks, the differences in survival rates are less dramatic. See id. 
75. See Backes et al., supra note 38, at 45. 
76. See Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists Committee on 
Obstetric Practice et al., Methods for Estimating the Due 
Date 2 (2017) (LMP is often inaccurate due to “inaccurate recall of the 
LMP, irregularities in cycle length, or variability in the timing of ovulation”). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 2·2019 
Does Stare Decisis Preclude Reconsideration of Roe v. Wade? 
298 
By far the most accurate method for determining gestational age 
currently relied upon by obstetricians is fetal ultrasound, which is based 
on crown-rump length during the first trimester.77 However, even at this 
stage of pregnancy, the margin of error is plus-or-minus five to seven 
days.78 Moreover, the accuracy of ultrasound assessments of gestational 
age decreases as the pregnancy progresses. So, for example, between 
the beginning of the twenty-second week and the end of the twenty-
seventh week of gestation, the accuracy is plus-or-minus ten to fourteen 
days, and in the third trimester (the beginning of the twenty-eighth 
week and beyond), the accuracy is plus-or-minus twenty-one to thirty 
days.79  
The remaining intrinsic factors also have problems with accuracy. 
For example, determining fetal weight is (obviously) more difficult and 
less accurate when the baby is still in utero, than it is when the baby 
already has been born prematurely.80 And extrapolations of fetal weight 
based on ultrasound may have a margin of error between 10 and 15 
percent.81 Determining the sex of the baby through ultrasound cannot 
be made with a high degree of accuracy until thirteen or fourteen 
weeks,82 and it is not uncommon for an early ultrasound to detect a 
multiple pregnancy, which is not supported by a later ultrasound.83 
In addition to the above intrinsic factors that are considered in 
assessing viability, there are a number of other factors that relate to 
extrinsic conditions (which may or may not be present). The most 
important of these factors that affect a newborn’s survivability is the 
type of prenatal and postnatal care administered. There are currently 
several different types of prenatal care that can greatly increase a 
newborn’s chance of survival and reduce the incidence and severity of 
 
77. Id. (stating that the first trimester ends after thirteen weeks, six days of 
gestation). 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 3. 
80. “[B]efore delivery, newborn birth weight can only be estimated. The 
inherent inaccuracy of ultrasound-estimated fetal weight introduces a 
degree of uncertainty to the prediction of newborn outcomes.” Am. Coll. 
of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, supra note 71, at e191. 
81. Jun Zhang et al., Defining Normal and Abnormal Fetal Growth: Promises 
and Challenges, 202 Am. J. Obstetrics & Gynecology 522, 525 (2010) 
(“The percentage of birth weight predictions within ±10% and ±15% of 
actual birthweight were, on average, 69.2% and 86.5%, respectively.”). 
82. Manette Kearin et al., Accuracy of Sonographic Fetal Gender Determination: 
Predictions Made by Sonographers During Routine Obstetric Ultrasound 
Scans, 17 Australasian J. Ultrasound Med. 125, 129 (2014). 
83. Ann L. Anderson-Berry & Terence Zach, Vanishing Twin Syndrome, 
Medscape (May 10, 2016), https://emedicine.medscape.com/article/271818-
overview [https://perma.cc/6QNE-FGFR]. 
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long-term disability. The administration of corticosteroids to the 
mother in advance of her anticipated premature birth greatly assists in 
the baby’s lung maturation, and is one of the most important therapies 
available to improve newborn outcomes. 84  Administration of mag–
nesium sulfate also has been shown to improve neurologic outcomes 
when given to the mother before she gives birth.85 And, there are a 
number of other medications that can be administered to the mother 
(depending on the cause of the anticipated premature birth) that 
improve newborn outcomes.86 
With respect to postnatal care, the most important factors are 
providing immediate resuscitation to the newborn at delivery and the 
provision of intensive care thereafter. Optimally, the delivery should 
take place in a hospital with an advanced neonatal intensive care unit 
(“NICU”).87 During the periviable period, both immediate resuscitation 
and intensive care are critical to survival.88 Thus, the location of the 
anticipated delivery and the provision of prenatal and postnatal care 
significantly impact survival rates of newborns at the limits of 
viability—currently about twenty-two weeks gestational age. 
3. Probabilities of Survival Vary Greatly 
Numerous medical studies report wide ranges of survival rates at 
various gestational ages during periviable birth.89 Significant disparities 
in survival rates can arise due to a variety of factors, including whether 
 
84. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, supra note 71, at e194. 
85. Id. 
86. See id. at e195. 
87. Id. at e191–92. Many of the medical conditions causing premature birth 
also require advanced care hospitals for favorable maternal outcome as 
well. So, it is more likely that a hospital capable of providing adequate 
care to the mother will also be able to meet the needs of the newborn. 
88. Extremely premature infants do not usually survive “without life-sustaining 
interventions immediately after delivery.” Id. at e191. As previously noted, 
“periviable birth” means a “delivery occurring from 20 0/7 weeks to 25 6/7 
weeks of gestation.” See Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists 
& Soc’y for Maternal-Fetal Med., supra note 71. 
89. See id. at e188 and studies cited therein. Survival to discharge rates were 
reported as 5–6% at less than twenty-three weeks; 23–27% at twenty-
three weeks; 42–59% at twenty-four weeks; and 67–76% at twenty-five 
weeks. Id. at e188–89; see also Backes et al., supra note 38, at 39 and studies 
cited therein; Matthew A. Rysavy et al., Between-Hospital Variation in 
Treatment and Outcomes in Extremely Preterm Infants, 372 New Eng. 
J. Med. 1801 (2015) and studies cited therein; Katrin Mehler et al., Survival 
Among Infants Born at 22 or 23 Weeks’ Gestation Following Active Prenatal 
and Postnatal Care, 170 JAMA Pediatrics 671 (2016).  
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newborn infants are provided only palliative care90 and die soon after 
birth, and whether reported survival rates are based on data that is 
older or more recent. Even where there are controls for these factors, 
though, wide ranges of survival rates have been reported. A recent 
study comparing infants born at twenty-two weeks gestation at two 
different hospitals—one in the United States, the other in Sweden—
reported survival-to-discharge rates of between 8 and 53 percent.91 Both 
hospitals had large NICUs, but each took a different approach to the 
provision of care. The hospital that routinely provided prenatal 
corticosteroid administration, neonatal resuscitation, and intensive care 
had substantially higher survival rates (53 percent) than the hospital 
that only selectively provided such care (8 percent).92 
4. There is No Consensus Regarding What Statistical Probability 
Determines Viability 
It also should be noted that there is no single source upon which a 
consensus rests for predicting when viability is reached. And, although 
there exists a widely available resource for estimating the likelihood of 
survival during the periviable period, the data upon which its 
calculations are based is quite old, given rapid advances in medical 
technology. 93  Thus, such predictive calculators cannot provide est–
imates of statistical probabilities of survival with “an accuracy 
equivalent to that initially reported” in the sources relied upon.94  
Moreover, even if a uniform and accurate source were available to 
establish the survival rates at various ages, there is no consensus within 
 
90. Extremely premature infants who are provided only palliative care and 
are not given any life-sustaining medical intervention should not be included 
in any viability prediction in the context of abortion because the Court’s 
definition of viability refers to the potential ability to survive “with 
artificial aid.” See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973). 
91. Backes et al., supra note 38 at 39. 
92. Id. at 39, 43. “[C]enter variability in the provision of treatment at 22 weeks 
of gestation accounts for 78% of the variation in survival.” Id. at 39. This 
study also cited other studies reporting that the provision of prenatal 
corticosteroids and neonatal intensive care were associated with reductions in 
the risk of death similar to those associated with a one-week increase in 
gestational age. See id. 
93. NICHD, supra note 74 (data covers infants born between 1998 and 2003). 
The Obstetric Care Consensus on periviable birth notes that these prediction 
models exist but cautions against their use because they were developed 
based on populations of neonates born during a given period and are not 
regularly updated as medical care advances to reflect the most current 
data available. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists & Soc’y 
for Maternal-Fetal Med., supra note 71, at e190–91. 
94. See Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists & Soc’y for 
Maternal-Fetal Med., supra note 71, at e191. 
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the medical community with respect to how great the chance of survival 
at a particular age must be in order for a baby to be deemed “viable.” 
Some doctors or medical facilities may deem a baby to be viable when 
there is, say, a 10 percent chance of survival, while others may not do 
so unless there is a 25 percent (or even a much greater) chance of 
survival.95 
From the foregoing discussion, it should be clear that there is, of 
necessity, a great deal of inaccuracy involved in attempting to 
determine gestational age and fetal weight. Even under optimal 
circumstances, these factors have margins of error that can cause the 
determination to be off by about a week. And errors of this magnitude 
are amplified when dealing with periviable babies because those babies’ 
chances of surviving increase dramatically with each week of gestational 
age and corresponding increases in fetal weight. 96  In addition, the 
knowledge and skill of the physician making the viability prediction is 
critical. Likewise, the type of pre- and post-natal care that the hospital 
where the birth takes place (and its policies toward treating or not 
treating periviable newborns at various ages), significantly affects the 
statistical probabilities for survival outcomes. All of these factors 
combined contribute to the fact that there is no current consensus 
regarding what statistical probability constitutes viability; and they 
make it unlikely that any consensus will be forthcoming in the near 
future. 
5. Evaluating Predictions of Viability Does Not Fall Within Judicial 
Competence 
From its inception, Roe’s reliance on viability as the critical point 
in time to assign value to an unborn child’s life has proven to be 
uncertain and unworkable. Roe held that the State’s interest in 
protecting prenatal life does not become sufficiently compelling until 
viability, that is, when the fetus is “potentially able to live outside the 
mother’s womb, albeit with artificial aid.”97 After this point, the Court 
said, the State may regulate abortion and go so far as to proscribe 
abortion.98 In addition, Roe seemingly set upper and lower limits for 
 
95. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
96. Once a gestational age is reached when the lungs have matured sufficiently 
to allow for independent living without neonatal intensive care, incremental 
increases in survival taper off. Id. at e188. 
97. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973). 
98. Id. at 162–63. Per the Court’s holding, the State may not prohibit those 
post-viability abortions that are necessary to save the life or health of the 
mother. Id. at 163. See infra Part IV (discussing whether the State’s 
purported authority to prohibit post-viability abortions (given the broad 
exceptions for maternal “health”) is real or illusory). 
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determining when viability was met—referring specifically to the time 
between twenty-four and twenty-eight weeks.99  
There was widespread agreement at the time of Roe that a baby 
over twenty-eight weeks was generally viable, while one under twenty-
four weeks could rarely survive.100 There was no consensus, however, 
regarding the period between twenty-four and twenty-eight weeks, and 
Roe gave no guidance with respect to how the State could permissibly 
protect an unborn child during this gray period.101 This was particularly 
vexing because Roe spoke, confusingly, of viability as being a “point,” 
as though it were a particular point in time, while at the same time it 
referred to viability as occurring somewhere between twenty-four and 
twenty-eight weeks of gestation, over a span of time. So, it was not 
clear how the State could define viability and what criteria it could 
require to be considered in making the assessment of viability. 
Immediately following Roe, numerous states set out to craft new 
abortion statutes that would comply with Roe’s dictates.102 Given the 
paucity of guidance in Roe itself, however, there were many differing 
approaches and numerous court challenges. 103  The district courts 
evaluating the constitutionality of these definitions often reached 
diametrically opposed conclusions. For example, the Missouri and 
Pennsylvania statutes both defined viability in a manner similar to the 
definition contained in Roe.104 Both definitions were challenged, with 
the plaintiffs in each case arguing that the definitions could only 
withstand a constitutional challenge if they contained a specific 
gestational age cut-off, which neither did. 
 
99. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 160. 
100. See Louis Hellman & Jack Pritchard, Williams Obstetrics 493 
(14th ed. 1971) (“Attainment of a weight of 1,000 g [about twenty-eight 
weeks] is therefore widely used as the criterion of viability.”). The text 
also stated: “Interpretations of the word ‘viability’ have varied between 
fetal weights of 400g (about twenty weeks’ gestation) and 1,000 g (about 
28 weeks).” Id. The lower twenty-week limit, however, was based on the 
report of a single case of a baby surviving at that age. See id. 
101. See Mary Anne Wood & Lisa Bolin Hawkins, State Regulation of Late 
Abortion and the Physician’s Duty of Care to the Viable Fetus, 45 Mo. 
L. Rev. 394, 401 (1980) (surveying state abortion laws that attempt to 
regulate or prohibit abortion after viability). 
102. Id. 
103. See id. 
104. The Pennsylvania statute defined viable as the “capability of a fetus to 
live outside the mother’s womb albeit with artificial aid.” See Planned 
Parenthood Ass’n v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554, 569 (E.D. Pa. 1975). 
The Missouri statute had minor variations, but was essentially the same. 
See Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth (Danforth I), 
392 F. Supp. 1362, 1368 (E.D. Mo. 1975). 
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In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, the district 
court upheld Missouri’s definition and rejected plaintiffs’ suggestion 
that a statutory definition of viability must “establish a specific point 
in gestation when the fetus is considered to be viable” to be 
constitutional.105 In Planned Parenthood Association v. Fitzpatrick,106 
however, the district court struck down Pennsylvania’s definition.107 
Unlike the Danforth court, the Fitzpatrick court had obtained extensive 
trial testimony from expert witnesses explaining the difficulties and 
uncertainties involved in making a prediction of viability—especially 
without any reference to gestational age.108 In holding that the statutory 
definition of viability was unconstitutionally vague, the district court 
stated: 
The ability of a fetus to live outside the mother’s womb cannot 
be determined directly. To reach such a judgment physicians 
must correlate certain probability of survival factors with the 
gestational age to determine viability as defined by the Act. The 
evidence clearly demonstrates that the statistical data available 
to the physician concerning fetus survival is not precise; also other 
variables such as the mother’s health and the quality of hospital 
facilities in the community must be taken into consideration. 
There is a lack of consensus within the medical community as to 
“the capability of a fetus to live outside the mother’s womb albeit 
with artificial aid” when the gestational age of the fetus is 
determined to be between 20 and 28 weeks.109  
The court concluded “that while not every physician who testified 
would reach exactly the same determination as to gestational age, there 
would be a consensus within reasonable and tolerable limits,” with 
respect to the method for determining gestational age.110 Thus, the court 
noted that “if the statute had even limited viability to 24 weeks 
gestation, it would be in conformity with the pronouncement of Roe, 
and not subject to a successful challenge.”111 In reaching this decision, 
 
105. Danforth I, 392 F. Supp. at 1368. The plaintiffs suggested “the period 
subsequent to the twenty-fourth week, or approximately the end of the 
second trimester” as an appropriate cut-off. Id. 
106. 401 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. Pa. 1975). 
107. Id. at 561. 
108. Id. at 569. 
109. Id. at 570 (also noting that physicians had no uniform position on what 
probability (e.g., 10 percent or 30 percent) of survival would be sufficient 
to qualify for viability). 
110. Id. at 569–70. 
111. Id. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 2·2019 
Does Stare Decisis Preclude Reconsideration of Roe v. Wade? 
304 
the Fitzpatrick court acknowledged the existence of the Danforth 
court’s prior ruling, but rejected its reasoning.112 
The first of these two cases to reach the Supreme Court was 
Danforth. With little discussion, the Court affirmed the district court’s 
holding with respect to the definition of viability in the Missouri law113:  
[W]e agree with the District Court that it is not the proper 
function of the legislature or the courts to place viability, which 
essentially is a medical concept, at a specific point in the gestation 
period. The time when viability is achieved may vary with each 
pregnancy, and the determination of whether a particular fetus is 
viable is, and must be, a matter for the judgment of the 
responsible attending physician.114  
There are two fundamental flaws with respect to the Court’s 
conclusion. First, the Court’s refusal to allow states to set any partic–
ular gestational age as a cut-off point suggests that the Court did not 
believe there is any consensus at all regarding viability. One would have 
thought, however, that it would have been perfectly permissible for a 
state to draw a line at, say, twenty-eight weeks, given the broad 
agreement that a baby at that stage of development is viable.115 
Second, the Court’s pronouncement—that a viability determination 
must be specific to a “particular fetus”—also suggests a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the concept of viability.116 It simply is not possible 
to make any accurate viability prediction with respect to a particular 
baby. Statistical survival probabilities are based on studies of survival 
rates within general populations of neonates at various gestational ages 
and do not predict the outcome for a particular newborn.117 “[W]hen a 
specific estimated probability for an outcome is offered, it should be 
 
112. Id. at 572. 
113. See Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth (Danforth II), 
428 U.S. 52, 63–65 (1976). Following the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Danforth (discussed below in the text), the first appeal in Fitzpatrick was 
remanded for reconsideration in light of, among other things, Danforth’s 
viability holding. See Beal v. Franklin, 428 U.S. 901 (1976). On remand, 
the district court upheld the definition of viability. See Colautti v. 
Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 385 (reciting the case’s history). The constitutionality 
of Pennsylvania’s definition of “viability” was not before the Court in Colautti. 
114. Danforth II, 428 U.S. at 64. 
115. See Hellman & Pritchard, supra note 100. 
116. See Danforth II, 428 U.S. at 64. 
117. See Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists & Soc’y for 
Maternal-Fetal Med., supra note 71, at e191. Prediction of outcome 
frequencies “provides only a point estimate reflecting a population average 
and cannot predict with certainty the outcome for an individual newborn.” 
Id. 
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stated clearly that this is an estimate for a population and not a 
prediction of a certain outcome for a particular patient in a given 
institution.”118 Moreover, if viability marks the point in time when the 
value of the unborn child becomes sufficient to support protection by 
the State, then there is no reason why one particular baby should have 
greater value than another of the same gestational age and, thus, the 
same probability of survival.119 
 In Colautti v. Franklin, 120  the Court restated the definition of 
viability again and further limited the State’s ability to provide any 
meaningful indicia for making viability assessments. It stated: “Via–
bility is reached when, in the judgment of the attending physician, on 
the particular facts of the case before him, there is a reasonable 
likelihood of the fetus’ sustained survival outside the womb . . . .”121 As 
Justice White noted in dissent, with this further refinement of the 
viability definition, Colautti withdrew from the states “a substantial 
measure of the power to protect fetal life that was reserved to them in 
Roe v. Wade.”122  
 
118. Id. 
119. The foregoing discussion highlights the incongruity of even discussing 
viability in the context of abortion. In the non-abortion context, a viability 
assessment is important when anticipating that a pregnancy will terminate 
prematurely, or when a pregnancy has terminated prematurely, due to 
circumstances largely outside the control of the pregnant woman and her 
physician. Thus, in the non-abortion context, assessing viability has an 
actual medical use: to inform medical judgments about appropriate treatment 
options for the unborn (or newborn) child. 
 In contrast, in the context of elective abortion, the circumstances that 
give rise to the pregnancy’s premature termination are wholly within the 
control of the woman and her physician. In the absence of an abortion, 
the pregnancy would continue to term and there would be no need for any 
assessment of viability. Thus, predicting viability has no actual medical use—
it is not done for the benefit of the pregnant woman or her unborn child. 
Instead, it simply identifies that stage in pregnancy when value may be 
accorded to the unborn, i.e., when the intentional premature termination 
of the pregnancy may be prohibited. 
 The Court ignores this essential difference when it tries to graft the 
concept of viability onto an abortion procedure involving the purposeful 
termination of the pregnancy. As a consequence, many of the usual factors 
that would be taken into consideration in making a viability prediction 
(e.g., pre- and post-natal care) are simply irrelevant in the context of 
abortion. This adds to the problems that make the viability rule unworkable 
in practice. 
120. 439 U.S. 379 (1979). For Colautti’s litigation history, see supra note 113. 
121. Colautti, 439 U.S. at 388. 
122. Id. at 401 (White, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
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 Roe spoke of viability in terms of the fetus being “potentially able 
to live” outside the mother’s womb123 —not in terms of having a 
“reasonable likelihood of sustained survival.”124 As in Danforth, the 
Court in Colautti did not see fit to give any explanation regarding what 
the new “reasonable likelihood of sustained survival” standard entails. 
Does a 20 percent probability of survival constitute a reasonable 
likelihood of survival? Or must it be more than a 50 percent (or perhaps 
75 percent) probability to qualify? And what is “sustained survival”? 
Does ten days qualify? Does discharge from the NICU qualify? Or, does 
it mean some other undefined time beyond that? Lower courts can only 
guess at the answers to these questions, and legislatures have been 
forbidden to refine their viability definitions in any manner other than 
as allowed by Colautti.125 
The Colautti Court clearly was aware of the serious difficulties that 
Roe’s definition of viability posed for physicians attempting to assess 
viability.126 In attempting to rectify this situation, the Court could have 
allowed the states to adopt bright-line gestational age cut-offs that were 
reasonable approximations of viability, as the plaintiff-physicians had 
urged in both Danforth and Fitzpatrick. This would have been 
consistent with Roe and would have avoided many, but not all, of the 
inherent difficulties associated with requiring physicians to make 
viability determinations.127  
Instead, the Court doubled down on its ambiguous and manipulable 
viability definition that placed the viability determination solely in the 
hands of the physician performing the abortion. And it further 
foreclosed the State’s ability to establish any bright-line objective 
standard beyond which abortions could be prohibited.128 Thus, Colautti 
severely crippled the State’s ability to enact any laws prohibiting (or 
even regulating) abortions after viability in a manner that could be 
meaningfully enforced (except, perhaps, if the baby is well into the third 
 
123. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973).  
124. See Colautti, 439 U.S. at 393 (majority opinion). 
125. In his partial dissent in Casey, Justice Rehnquist noted that the Court in 
Colautti determined that only one definition of viability would be 
tolerated—its own—and that States were prohibited from trying to 
impose any “objective indicator” that would govern the definition of 
viability. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833, 949 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
126. See Colautti, 439 U.S. at 395–96. 
127. There still would have been problems with accurately determining gestational 
age, but this would have avoided all of the other problematic aspects involved 
in attempting to make an assessment of viability. 
128. See Colautti, 439 U.S. at 388–89. 
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trimester when the abortion is performed and bad faith can be 
proven).129 
All of these same difficulties and uncertainties as to determining 
gestational age late in pregnancy and assessing viability remain today. 
Not one of them has been clarified or removed by the Court’s post-
Colautti decisions, so the criteria for assessing viability remain both 
undefined and undefinable. And the Court has determined that the 
purely subjective decisions that these physicians make may not be 
questioned. 
In effect, then, the Court has granted virtual immunity to abortion 
doctors in determining whether a baby they wish to abort is viable. In 
so doing, the Court has ceded to third-party physicians the ability to 
determine both the extent of a woman’s constitutional right to abortion 
and the constitutional value to be accorded to the unborn child. By 
abandoning the field, the Court has tacitly admitted that there are 
simply no standards capable of being properly applied by the courts to 
evaluate viability. In short, the Court has imposed upon the states a 
“constitutional” mandate that it lacks judicial competence to rule upon 
in any consistent and workable manner. 
The Court has done this not out of necessity, but based on a 
completely arbitrary decision to cling to its choice of the completely 
arbitrary line of viability. The Court has not explained—indeed, it 
cannot explain—why either a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy 
or the State’s right to prohibit that action should hinge on a term so 
indeterminate as “viability.” 
A brief examination of a hypothetical situation demonstrates just 
how unworkable the Court’s viability rule is. Under the Court’s 
judgments, a woman’s constitutional right to terminate her pregnancy 
is dependent on where she lives within a state and the skill (or lack 
thereof) of her physician. Take two women who are twenty-five weeks 
pregnant. One seeks an abortion from a board-certified obstetrician-
gynecologist who practices at a tertiary care hospital with an advanced 
NICU where intensive care is routinely provided to newborns at this 
age and the survival rate is in excess of 75 percent. The other seeks to 
have an abortion performed at a rural outpatient clinic by a physician 
who is not knowledgeable about current survival rates for premature 
babies.130 The first physician would likely judge the baby to be viable, 
 
129. Having been given responsibility for performing an impossible task—
determining viability for a particular baby—it is no wonder that physicians 
have argued that they must be given absolute immunity from prosecution 
for performing a post-viability abortion. See Brief for American Public 
Health Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 30–
32, Beal v. Franklin, 428 U.S. 901 (1976) (No. 75-709). 
130. A survey conducted by researchers from the University of Alabama found 
that obstetricians and pediatricians significantly underestimated premature 
infants’ odds of survival and overestimated their chances of developing a 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 2·2019 
Does Stare Decisis Preclude Reconsideration of Roe v. Wade? 
308 
while the second may likely judge the baby to be not viable. Thus, one 
woman would be unable to secure an abortion while the other would be 
able to obtain an abortion. Indeed, if one of the women goes first to the 
skilled physician and is denied the abortion and then goes to the non-
skilled physician later that day, her baby may be deemed both “viable” 
and “non-viable” on the same day! 
There is simply no plausible reason for basing the woman’s 
constitutional right to abortion on her location or the skill level of her 
physician. Nor is there any plausible reason for suggesting that the 
baby’s life is valuable and capable of being protected in one instance 
and not in the other. Neither of these interests should be determined 
by such haphazard means. 
From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the viability rule does 
not represent a simple limitation beyond which a state law is unenforce–
able, unless the Court means that it is simple because it is left solely in 
the hands of the abortion physician and, thus, is completely unenforce–
able. In that case, it may be “workable” in the sense that the State 
always loses. But, surely that is not what the Court meant. For a rule 
to be “workable,” it must accomplish its goal. Unless Roe intended to 
allow abortion on demand throughout pregnancy—a position it 
adamantly disavowed131—it cannot be said that a holding that so 
severely limits the ability of the State to protect prenatal life is 
“workable” in any meaningful sense.  
6. There Are Other Lines That Would Be More Workable Than Viability 
Despite the Casey Joint Opinion’s bald assertion that the Court’s 
arbitrary viability line is “more workable” than any other,132 nothing 
could be further from the truth. Allowing states to draw a bright-line 
cut-off at a specific gestational age would certainly be more workable 
for both physicians and the states.133 Indeed, a line drawn at the end of 
 
serious handicap. Roxanne Nelson, Premature Babies Do Better than 
Many Doctors Believe, WebMD (May 8, 2000), https://www.webmd 
 .com/baby/news/20000508/better-survival-rates-for-premature-babies#1 
[https://perma.cc/N345-TKA6]. 
131. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (rejecting the argument that 
“the woman’s right is absolute and that she is entitled to terminate her 
pregnancy at whatever time, in whatever way, and for whatever reason 
she alone chooses”); id. at 154 (“The privacy right involved . . . cannot 
be said to be absolute.”). 
132. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833, 870 (1992).  
133. A bright-line gestational cut-off at, say, twenty-two weeks, would be a 
reasonable approximation of viability. This would address most of the 
concerns of physicians and enhance the states’ enforcement capabilities. 
See supra Part III.A.4 and notes 108–119, 125–129 and accompanying 
text.  
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the first trimester, as Justice Blackmun initially proposed in his draft 
opinion in Roe, would be far more workable than viability.134 This is 
because gestational age determinations made within the first trimester 
are far more accurate than those made later in pregnancy. 
Physicians would be required only to make a relatively simple 
determination of gestational age and not be burdened with trying to 
make predictions of viability. In addition, it would be much easier for 
states to enforce such a cut-off. 
Given that the viability line was entirely arbitrary to begin with, it 
simply represented the judgment of seven members of the Court with 
respect to the proper value to be accorded to the unborn child’s life. 
There is no constitutional principle upon which the Court—rather than 
the duly elected representatives of the states—should be allowed to 
make that value judgment. 
Roe’s viability rule is entirely arbitrary and is not supported by any 
“reasoned explanation.” Moreover, contrary to the Joint Opinion, it is 
“unsound in principle and unworkable in practice.”135 The fact that the 
viability rule—the essential holding of Roe—defies practical workability 
provides a compelling reason to reconsider and overrule Roe.136 
B. Reliance 
The second stare decisis factor identified in Casey is:  
[W]hether the rule [that a pregnant woman has a right to obtain 
an abortion before her unborn child is viable, regardless of her 
reason for the abortion] is subject to a kind of reliance that would 
lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add 
inequity to the cost of repudiation.137  
 
134. The scope of this Article is limited to demonstrating that Casey’s reliance 
upon principles of stare decisis in support of its partial reaffirmation of 
Roe was entirely unwarranted. It is not our intent, by mentioning this (or 
any other) example of a more workable line than viability, to endorse that 
cut-off as the most workable alternative to viability. Rather, it is simply 
used to demonstrate that the Court’s claim regarding viability was clearly 
wrong. 
135. See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 518 (1989) (Rehnquist, 
C.J) (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 
546 (1985)). 
136. See Paulsen, supra note 9, at 1177 (“[T]he more standardless, variable, 
and difficult-to-apply the holding of a particular case[,] the less it tends 
to yield predictable, principled results; the more unworkable that rule is; 
the greater the justification for discarding it.”).  
137. Casey, 505 U.S. at 854–55. 
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“The inquiry into reliance,” the Joint Opinion stated, “counts the cost 
of a rule’s repudiation as it would fall on those who have relied 
reasonably on the rule’s continued application.”138 
The Joint Opinion tacitly conceded that, in sharp contrast to cases 
involving property or contract rights and duties, “where advance 
planning of great precision is most obviously a necessity,”139 there could 
not be any specific reliance in the continuation of a right to abortion, 
as such.140 That is because, as the Joint Opinion recognized, “repro–
ductive planning could take virtually immediate account of any sudden 
restoration of state authority to ban abortions.”141 The Joint Opinion, 
however, refused to restrict the reliance interest “to specific instances 
of sexual activity,”142 explaining: 
[F]or two decades of economic and social developments, people 
have organized intimate relationships and made choices that 
define their views of themselves and their places in society, in 
reliance on the availability of abortion in the event that 
contraception should fail. The ability of women to participate 
equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been 
facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives.143  
The Joint Opinion concluded its analysis of the reliance factor by 
asserting that “while the effect of reliance on Roe cannot be exactly 
measured, neither can the certain cost of overruling Roe[,]for people 
who have ordered their thinking and living around that case[,] be 
dismissed.”144 
There are several significant problems with the Court’s analysis of 
the reliance factor. First, the alleged reliance interest the Court 
identifies in the availability of legal abortion has no necessary relation–
ship to Roe’s choice of viability to protect that interest. The Court just 
as easily could have chosen the end of the first trimester, or even an 
earlier time (soon after unprotected sex) if “failed contraception” were 
of concern. 
Second, the Joint Opinion’s attempt to attribute “two decades of 
economic and social developments” to Roe is, as Chief Justice 
 
138. Id. at 855. 
139. Id. at 856.  
140. See id. 
141. Id. 
142. Id.  
143. Id. 
144. Id. 
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Rehnquist said in his partial dissent, “undeveloped and totally 
conclusory.”145 
Surely it is dubious to suggest that women have reached their 
“places in society” in reliance upon Roe, rather than as a result 
of their determination to obtain higher education and compete 
with men in the job market, and of society’s increasing 
recognition of their ability to fill positions that were previously 
thought to be reserved only for men.146  
Most of the economic and social developments to which the Joint 
Opinion alluded (but never described or identified) have resulted from 
a nationwide commitment to establishing equal rights for women that 
has had little or nothing to do with the availability of legal abortion. 
As two commentators have observed: 
Roe is rarely cited as a precedent for women’s rights in any area 
other than abortion. Virtually all progress in women’s legal, social 
and employment rights over the past 30 years has come about 
through federal or state legislation and judicial interpretation 
wholly unrelated to and not derived from Roe v. Wade.147  
That observation, made in the same year Casey was decided, 
remains true today, almost thirty years later. Whatever progress has 
been made in the law in combating sex discrimination and promoting 
women’s rights is attributable primarily to Congressional and state 
legislative action, and, to a lesser extent, judicial doctrines entirely 
independent of Roe.148 
 
145. Id. at 956 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
146. Id. at 956–57. 
147. Paige Comstock Cunningham & Clarke D. Forsythe, Is Abortion the 
“First Right” for Women?, in Abortion, Medicine, and the Law 100, 
154 (J. Douglas Butler & David F. Walbert eds., 4th ed. 1992) (footnote 
omitted). 
148. The Supreme Court has invalidated state laws giving a preference to men 
in issuing letters of administration in probate cases, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 
404 U.S. 71 (1971); limiting admission to public institutions of higher 
learning to members of only one sex, United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 
515 (1996); and allowing a husband, as “head and master” of property 
jointly owned with his wife, the unilateral right to dispose of such property 
without his spouse’s consent, Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981). 
The Court has also prohibited the use of peremptory challenges of 
potential jurors solely on the basis of gender. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. 
T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994). And the Court has invalidated federal laws 
requiring dependents of servicewomen, but not servicemen, to prove their 
dependence in order to receive quarters’ allowances and medical and 
dental benefits, Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), and a public 
school board policy mandating that every teacher in an advanced stage of 
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Congress has enacted statutes prohibiting sex and pregnancy 
discrimination in public and private employment,149 and in unemploy–
ment compensation. 150  It has also prohibited sex discrimination in 
federally funded public works projects and aid to highways,151 personnel 
policies,152 equal pay,153 the sale or rental of housing,154 credit transac–
tions155 and education.156 Almost all of the states have enacted similar 
legislation.157 And eighteen states have adopted provisions to their state 
constitutions mandating equal rights or otherwise prohibiting discrim–
ination on account of sex.158 
 
pregnancy be placed on leave, Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Le Fleur, 414 
U.S. 632 (1974). 
149. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(k), 2000e-
2(a) (2012). 
150. Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(12) (2012). 
151. Public Works and Economic Development Act Amendments of 1971, 42 
U.S.C. § 3123 (2012) (public works); 23 U.S.C. § 324 (2012) (highways). 
152. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1)(A), (C) (2012). 
153. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2012). 
154. Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2012). 
155. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1) (2012). 
156. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012). 
157. According to the National Council of State Legislatures, forty-five out of 
fifty States prohibit sex discrimination in public accommodations, forty-
nine prohibit sex discrimination in employment and thirty-nine prohibit 
pregnancy discrimination in employment. See State Public Accommodation 
Laws, Nat’l Conf. St. Legislatures (Apr. 8, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/ 
 research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-public-accommodation-laws.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/BZ9Y-ZRLB]; Discrimination—Employment Laws, Nat’l 
Conf. St. Legislatures (July 27, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/ 
 labor-and-employment/discrimination-employment.aspx [https://perma.cc/ 
 SBW7-7GL5]; Nat’l Conf. St. Legislatures, State Employment-
Related Discrimination Statutes (July 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/ 
 documents/employ/Discrimination-Chart-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
 B8W3-LB29]. All states but one (Mississippi) prohibit sex discrimination in 
credit transactions. See Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., Credit Disc–
rimination app. F, at 407–29 (7th ed. 2018) (additionally citing many 
state statutes prohibiting sex discrimination in housing). 
158. Alaska Const. art. I, § 3 (2014); Cal. Const. art. I, § 8 (Deering 2018); 
Colo. Const. art II, § 29 (West 2010); Conn. Const. art. I, § 20 (2014); 
Haw. Const. art. I, §§ 3, 5 (2009); Ill. Const. art. I, §§ 17, 18 (West 
2018); La. Const. art. I, § 12 (2006); Md. Const. Decl. of Rights, 
art. XLVI (LexisNexis 2003); Mass. Const. pt. 1, art. I (West 2007); 
Mont. Const. art. II, § 4 (2015); N.H. Const. pt. 1, art. II (West 2017); 
N.M. Const. art. II, § 18 (2014); Pa. Const. art. I, § 28 (West 2011); 
Tex. Const. art. I, § 3a (West 2018); Utah Const. art. IV, § 1 
(LexisNexis 1991); Va. Const. art. I, § 11 (2008); Wash. Const. art. 
XXXI, § 1 (West 2011); Wyo. Const. art VI, § 1 (2015). The scope and 
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From the foregoing, it is clear that it is not permissible to 
discriminate against women for becoming pregnant or failing to abort 
their children. Because such discrimination is illegal, women do not 
need to resort to abortion in order to enjoy equal rights with men. 
The Joint Opinion also suggested that women cannot achieve 
equality with men without legal abortion because “people have 
organized intimate relationships . . . in reliance on the availability of 
abortion in the event that contraception should fail,” and that women 
need to be able “to control their reproductive lives.”159 
Whatever may be said of women’s need to control their 
reproductive lives in order to participate equally in society, there are 
certainly numerous means (short of abortion) available to women to 
achieve that goal. First, it is highly doubtful that women need to rely 
upon abortion up until viability in the event of contraceptive failure, 
because actual contraceptive failure is exceedingly rare,160 unless what 
the Court really meant by “contraceptive failure” is the failure to use 
 
interpretation of these provisions differ from state to state. In addition to 
those eighteen states, in 1998 two states added gender-inclusive language 
to their inalienable rights guarantees. See Fla. Const. art. I, § 2 (2016) 
(“All natural persons, female and male alike, are equal before the law and 
have inalienable rights, among which are the right to enjoy and defend 
life and liberty, to pursue happiness, to be rewarded for industry, and to 
acquire, possess and protect property.”) (emphasis added); Iowa Const. 
art. I, § 1 (2013) (“All men and women are, by nature, free and equal, 
and have certain inalienable rights—among which are those of enjoying and 
defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and 
pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness.”) (emphasis added). 
159. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
856 (1992). 
160. A wide range of contraceptive methods are currently readily available for both 
women and men. Typical-use failure rates are the rates in actual practice, and 
include “inconsistent or incorrect use, and even outright nonuse among 
individuals who report using.” Aparna Sundaram et al., Contraceptive Failure 
in the United States: Estimates from the 2006–2010 National Survey of Family 
Growth, 49 Persp. on Sexual & Reproductive Health 7, 7 (2017) 
(emphasis added), available at https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/ 
 files/article_files/4900717.pdf [https://perma.cc/C5MJ-NG48]. These rates 
vary according to the type of method used. According to the Guttmacher 
Institute, typical-use failure rates for the most commonly used reversible 
contraceptives are as follows: 1% for the IUD and implants; 4% for 
injectables; 7% for the pill; 13% for the condom; and 20% for withdrawal. 
Id. If one uses any of these in combination with another method, the 
typical-use failure rate would be much lower. For example, using the pill 
and condom together results in a failure rate of less than one percent 
(0.0091 = 0.07 (7%) x 0.13 (13%)). In addition, there are more types of 
contraceptives available now than in 1973 or 1992, and they are 
significantly more effective than contraceptives were then. See id. The 
failure rates for all methods (except withdrawal) “decreased substantially” 
between 2002 and 2010. Id. at 13. 
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contraceptives responsibly. But the failure to use contraceptives is 
hardly consistent with the notion of women taking “control [of] their 
reproductive lives.” Instead, the Court seemed to be claiming that 
abortion must remain legal—virtually on demand—because women 
(and men) refuse to take control of their reproductive lives by using 
contraception responsibly while engaging in conduct that can result in 
a pregnancy that they wish to avoid. 
Failing to overrule Roe because of this has nothing to do with 
genuine equality between the sexes. Instead, it simply promotes the use 
of abortion as another method of birth control—one that is certainly 
not necessary given the many other options available.161 In short, with 
or without Roe, women will continue to have numerous means available 
to prevent pregnancy and to control their reproductive lives if they so 
choose. Because there is no demonstrable personal or societal reliance 
interest in continued access to abortion on demand up until viability, 
overruling Roe would not, contrary to the Joint Opinion, cause “serious 
inequity to those who have relied upon it or significant damage to the 
stability of the society governed by it.”162 
C. Change in Law 
The third stare decisis factor identified in Casey is “whether related 
principles of law have so far developed as to have left the old rule [that 
a pregnant woman has a right to obtain an abortion for any reason 
before viability] no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine.”163 In 
its analysis of this factor, the Joint Opinion stated that “[n]o evolution 
of legal principle has left Roe’s doctrinal footings weaker than they were 
in 1973,”164 and that “[n]o development of constitutional law since the 
case was decided has implicitly or explicitly left Roe behind as a mere 
survivor of obsolete constitutional thinking.”165 
 
161. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, almost 43 
percent of abortions are performed on women who have had at least one 
prior abortion. Tara C. Jatlaoui et al., Ctrs. for Disease Control 
& Prevention, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report: 
Abortion Surveillance—United States, 2016, at 37 tbl.17 (2019), 
available at https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/68/ss/pdfs/ss6811a1-
H.pdf [https://perma.cc/3H95-A5ME]. 
162. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 855. In addition, a Supreme Court decision 
overruling Roe would have an extremely modest impact on the legality of 
abortion in the overwhelming majority of states. See Paul Benjamin 
Linton, Overruling Roe v. Wade: The Implications for the Law, 32 Issues 
L. & Med. 341, 346–48 (2017). 
163. Casey, 505 U.S. at 855. 
164. Id. at 857.  
165. Id. 
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1. Constitutional Law 
Given the reluctance of the authors of the Joint Opinion to state 
that Roe was correctly decided as an original matter of constitutional 
interpretation,166 what possible difference could it make whether Roe 
has been undermined by later decisions? And the unstated assumption 
that only a decision that becomes less defensible over time may be 
reconsidered would lead to the anomalous result that “the most 
outlandish constitutional decision could survive forever, based simply 
on the fact that it was no more outlandish later than it was when 
originally rendered.”167 “That the flaws in an opinion were evident at 
the time it was handed down is hardly a reason for adhering to it.”168 
Indeed, the Joint Opinion’s decision to hold on to the viability rule 
while letting go of other aspects of Roe, particularly the trimester 
framework, manifests a certain intellectual incoherence. As Chief 
Justice Rehnquist noted in his partial dissent: 
The [Joint O]pinion frankly concludes that Roe and its progeny 
were wrong in failing to recognize that the State’s interests in 
maternal health and in the protection of unborn human life exist 
throughout pregnancy. But there is no indication that these 
components of Roe are any more incorrect at this juncture than 
they were at its inception.169 
Putting the foregoing aside, the Court’s rationale for invoking stare 
decisis in defense of Roe’s constitutional underpinnings does not 
withstand scrutiny. 170  The Joint Opinion asserted that a woman’s 
constitutional right to abort her unborn child until viability need not 
be re-examined because “Roe’s doctrinal footings” were not weaker 
 
166. See Paul Benjamin Linton, Planned Parenthood v. Casey: The Flight from 
Reason in the Supreme Court, 13 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 15, 18–19 
(identifying multiple passages in the Joint Opinion expressing misgivings 
as to whether Roe was correctly decided). 
167. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 955–56 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); see also Thornburgh v. American Coll. of Obstetricians 
& Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 788 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (“[I]f an 
argument that a constitutional decision is erroneous must be novel in 
order to justify overruling that precedent, the Court’s decisions in Lochner 
v. New York and Plessy v. Ferguson would remain the law, for the doctrines 
announced in those decisions were nowhere more eloquently or incisively 
criticized than in the dissenting opinions of Justices Holmes (in Lochner) 
and Harlan (in both cases).”) (citations omitted). 
168. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 788 (White, J., dissenting). 
169. Casey, 505 U.S. at 956 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (citation omitted). 
170. Id. at 857–59 (majority opinion). In attempting to shore up Roe’s legitimacy 
and assert its stability, the Court actually does much to undermine both.  
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than they were in 1973.171 The Joint Opinion then noted “that Roe 
stands at an intersection of two lines of decisions.” 172  One strand 
involves liberty interests “relating to intimate relationships, the family, 
and decisions about whether or not to beget or bear a child.”173 The 
other relates to an interest grounded in “personal autonomy and bodily 
integrity, with doctrinal affinity to cases recognizing limits on govern–
mental power to mandate medical treatment or to bar its rejection.”174 
Finally, the Joint Opinion stated that “one could classify Roe as sui 
generis.”175 
With respect to the first line of decisions, it may be accurate to 
state that no subsequent cases have undermined that line of authority, 
but then those decisions did not support Roe at the time, as Roe itself 
acknowledged. 176  And the fact that they still do not support Roe 
obviously provides no basis for the Court to continue to adhere to Roe. 
Although not relied upon in Roe, the Casey Court claimed that a 
second line of cases limiting the government’s ability to mandate 
medical treatment may also support Roe.177 The Joint Opinion stated, 
“our cases since Roe accord with Roe’s view that a State’s interest in 
the protection of life falls short of justifying any plenary override of 
individual liberty claims.”178 Remarkably, none of the five cases cited 
 
171. See id. at 857. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. This was the line of decisions that Roe referred to as recognizing a 
right of personal privacy. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973). 
Casey described some of those same cases as affording “constitutional 
protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, 
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education.” See 
Casey, 505 U.S. at 851. Of course, none of those cases involved a personal 
decision that would end the life of another individual, as happens in the 
case of a decision to obtain an abortion. So, none supports Roe. 
174. Casey, 505 U.S. at 857. 
175. Id. The Court’s inability to identify which of the above lines of decisions 
actually controls, or whether Roe is sui generis and neither applies, 
suggests that the Court was at least uncertain of what Roe’s doctrinal 
footings actually are. 
176. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (whether a woman has a right to obtain an 
abortion “is inherently different from marital intimacy, or bedroom possession 
of obscene material, or marriage, or procreation, or education”) (emphasis 
added). And the Court in Casey recognized that Roe was “an extension 
of those cases.” See Casey, 505 U.S. at 853. 
177. Casey, 505 U.S. at 857. The Court, however, made no attempt to explain 
how cases limiting a government’s power to mandate medical treatment 
might relate to a woman’s right to abortion. The woman seeking an 
abortion is requesting that a medical procedure be performed on her—she 
is not rejecting state-mandated medical treatment. 
178. Id. 
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supports the Court’s assertion.179 If anything, they support the opposite 
conclusion. 180  Moreover, just five years after Casey, the Court, in 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 181  directly contradicted this premise by 
holding that a State’s interest in protecting human life is sufficient to 
override an individual’s liberty interest in obtaining assistance in 
committing suicide.182  
The Court began its review in Glucksberg by carefully examining 
“our Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practices” with respect to 
the asserted liberty interest. 183  The Court noted that suicide and 
assisted suicide had been crimes for hundreds of years at common law, 
and that the vast majority of the states continued to criminalize 
assisted suicide by statute.184 Accordingly, it rejected the claim that 
“the ‘liberty’ specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes a 
right to commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in 
 
179. Although the Court referred to cases decided “since” Roe, only three of 
the cited cases were decided after Roe. See id.; infra note 180. The other 
two—Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), and Jacobson v. 
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905), were decided before Roe. In Rochin, 
the Court held that the State could not use illegally obtained evidence in 
a criminal trial. 342 U.S. at 174. Its relevance is unclear. In Jacobson, the 
Court held that the State’s interest in preventing the spread of smallpox 
was sufficient to support a mandatory vaccination requirement. 197 U.S. 
at 39. This directly contradicts the proposition for which Casey cited it. 
See Casey, 505 U.S. at 857. The Court also overlooked Arver v. United 
States (Selective Draft Law Cases), 245 U.S. 366 (1918), which upheld the 
authority of Congress to impose conscription. Id. at 389–90. 
180. In both Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990), and Riggins v. 
Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992), the Court held that the State may 
administer anti-psychotic drugs to a prison inmate against his will (even 
though the drug could have serious side effects, including death) if the 
State has demonstrated that the inmate is dangerous to himself or others 
and the treatment is in his medical interest. Harper, 494 U.S. at 225–26; 
Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135. And while Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep’t 
of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990), did suggest that a competent adult may 
have a constitutional liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical 
treatment, id. at 278–79, it did so only after an extensive examination of 
the common law and state laws. Id. at 269–78. The Court noted that 
under common law, unconsented touching was long considered to be a 
battery and that the concept of informed consent had grown out of that 
common law principle. Id. at 269. The Court ultimately held, however, 
that the State’s interest in protecting human life was sufficient to require 
clear and convincing evidence of an incompetent individual’s desire to 
refuse life-sustaining treatment before such treatment could be removed. 
Id. at 284. 
181. 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
182. Id. at 728–35. 
183. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 710–19. 
184. Id. 
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doing so.”185 Therefore, the Court’s most recent pronouncement on 
whether a State’s interest in protecting vulnerable life may override an 
individual’s asserted liberty interest holds that it may. Glucksberg 
certainly leaves Roe’s doctrinal footings weaker than they were when 
Roe and Casey were decided. 
Not one of the cases that the Casey Court cited in support of Roe’s 
constitutional bona fides remotely supports a claim that a person has a 
recognizable liberty interest (whether based on a claim of bodily 
integrity or a right to bear a child) sufficient to end the life of another.186 
Roe stands alone in this respect. And it does so only by pretending that 
abortion does not do what it actually does—end the life of another 
individual human.187 
The Court’s utter inability to cite to any prior decision that holds 
that an individual’s personal autonomy extends to ending another 
human life seriously undermines Roe’s constitutional foundation. 
Perhaps in recognition of that glaring deficiency, the Joint Opinion 
suggested that “one could classify Roe as sui generis.”188 It then stated 
 
185. Id. at 723. That Glucksberg, like Roe, dealt with the State’s interest in 
protecting human life, distinguishes both cases from Obergefell v. Hodges, 
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), which involved no such interest. 
186. In summarizing the cases relied upon, the Court said, “Our law affords 
constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, 
procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education.” 
Casey, 505 U.S. at 851. None of these cases involved the taking of a human 
life in the pursuit of individual liberty. 
187. Although the Court in Roe professed not to decide “the difficult question 
of when life begins,” see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973), it clearly 
did decide this question by referring to the unborn child as only “potential 
life.” See id. at 150. That the unborn child, biologically, is actually alive 
and not just “potential life” is undeniable. See infra Part III.D.2. In any 
event, there is nothing in the Constitution that suggests that a question 
of this nature and magnitude (when human life begins) should rest with nine 
unelected members of the Court rather than the elected representatives of 
the people. Moreover, to the extent that the question of when human life 
begins is a judgment with respect to the value that should be given to the 
unborn child’s existing life, it is not a legal question. See Casey, 505 U.S. 
at 982 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that 
there is no way to determine “as a legal matter” whether “the human 
fetus is in some critical sense merely potentially human” which “is in fact 
a value judgment”). And, the unelected members of the Court have no 
special knowledge or skills with which to make this value determination. 
188. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 857. Of course, Roe is sui generis. It is the only 
circumstance in which the lives of two individuals are intertwined. Though 
rare, there are cases in which a pregnancy itself may jeopardize a pregnant 
woman’s life. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 880 (referencing “preeclampsia, 
inevitable abortion, and premature ruptured membrane”). Because of 
this, delicate balancing of the State’s interest in protecting human life 
(both the pregnant woman’s life and that of her unborn child) may be 
necessary. As noted above, it is a balancing that the State is better 
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that when “so viewed, . . . there clearly has been no erosion of its central 
determination.”189 Oddly, the Court proceeded to demonstrate that 
there has been a significant and steady erosion in support for Roe. The 
Court began by noting that Roe was a 7–2 decision in 1973.190 It 
continued by noting that Roe was affirmed by a 6–3 vote in 1983 (Akron 
Center), and by a 5–4 vote in 1986 (Thornburgh).191 Finally, the Court 
acknowledged that in 1989, Roe was questioned by five members of the 
Court in Webster, but not expressly overruled.192 Indeed, in Webster, 
only four justices would have expressly reaffirmed Roe. And, given the 
evisceration of Roe in Casey itself,193 it appears that in 1992, only 
Justices Blackmun and Stevens would have reaffirmed Roe as it was 
originally decided. Far from demonstrating that Roe is stable, the 
Court’s above recitation of the relevant history shows that Roe has not 
been stable for quite some time.194 
Finally, the Joint Opinion said, “[e]ven on the assumption that the 
central holding of Roe was in error, that error would go only to the 
strength of the state interest in fetal protection, not to the recognition 
afforded by the Constitution to the woman’s liberty.”195 Again, this 
attempt to justify Roe actually undercuts Roe’s validity. The Joint 
Opinion seems to be suggesting that the extent of a woman’s liberty 
interest outlined in Roe is somehow independent of the State’s interest 
in protecting fetal life—as though one can be affected without affecting 
the other. But, logically, that cannot be the case. 
Roe stated that a woman’s liberty interest is not absolute.196 Thus, 
the extent of that liberty is limited by something. And what limits the 
woman’s liberty interest in obtaining an abortion is the strength of the 
State’s interest in protecting the life of the unborn child. So, if the 
central holding of Roe was in error regarding the strength of the State 
 
equipped to undertake than the Court. And it should be noted that no 
state, prior to Roe, prohibited an abortion when the procedure was necessary 
to save the life of the pregnant woman. 
189. Casey, 505 U.S. at 857. 
190. Id. at 857–58. 
191. Id. at 858 (citing City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 
Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Thornburgh v. American Coll. of Obstetricians 
& Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986)). 
192. Casey, 505 U.S. at 857–58. 
193. See supra Part II (explaining how Casey abandoned major aspects of Roe). 
194. Justice Rehnquist’s dissent well described how the Court’s opinions have 
become increasingly splintered as the Court has expanded upon the ruling 
in Roe. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 945–50 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
195. Id. at 858 (joint opinion). 
196. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153–54 (1973). 
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interest in protecting an unborn child’s life, then it was also in error 
regarding the extent of a woman’s liberty interest. If the State’s interest 
was undervalued, it was only because the scope of a woman’s liberty 
interest was overvalued. 
The Court concluded its constitutional justification for Roe by 
suggesting that the State could force women to abort if abortion were 
not constitutionally protected. 197  As Justice Scalia noted, this 
contention reveals “the utter bankruptcy of constitutional analysis 
deprived of tradition as a validating factor.”198 It is clear that the right 
to bear and beget a child is deeply rooted in our nation’s history, legal 
traditions, and practices and, therefore, is constitutionally protected. 
The right to abortion, however, is not.199 Thus, the right to conceive 
and give birth to a child is protected wholly independent of any alleged 
right to end the life of a child through abortion.200 
Nothing in the Casey Court’s attempt to preserve and fortify Roe’s 
constitutional roots accomplishes that goal. Roe is as wrong today as 
it was in 1973, and there is no need for any further change in 
constitutional law to prevent Roe from being re-examined and over–
ruled. By focusing narrowly on constitutional law, however, the Court 
managed to avoid viewing the broader legal landscape with regard to 
the protection of an unborn child. Nevertheless, that landscape has 
changed dramatically in a way that significantly undermines Roe. 
 
197. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 859. 
198. Id. at 981 n.1 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
199. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 174–77 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The legal 
literature criticizing Roe is voluminous. The most detailed and thorough 
critique of Justice Blackmun’s superficial and misleading account of the 
treatment of abortion under English and American law, which also 
criticizes subsequent efforts to shore-up support for Justice Blackmun’s 
reading of the historical record, is Joseph W. Dellapenna, Dispelling 
the Myths of Abortion History (2006). See also Joseph W. 
Dellapenna, The History of Abortion: Technology, Morality, and Law, 40 
U. Pitt. L. Rev. 359 (1979). For an excellent overview of the early 
scholarly response to Roe, see John T. Noonan, Jr., Inquiry 5 “On the 
Constitutional Foundation of the Liberty”, in A Private Choice 
Abortion in America in the Seventies 20 (1979). The gradual 
replacement of the common law crime of abortion by statutory prohibitions 
in the nineteenth century is described in James S. Witherspoon, Reexamining 
Roe: Nineteenth-Century Abortion Statutes and the Fourteenth Amendment, 
17 St. Mary’s L.J. 29 (1985). Finally, both the statutory history and 
state-court explanations of the reasons for which abortion statutes were 
enacted in the nineteenth century are set forth in Linton, supra note 166, 
app. A, at 103–14.  
200. As Casey noted, the right to use contraceptives is “protected independently 
under Griswold and later cases.” 505 U.S. at 859. So, overruling Roe would 
not affect that right, either. 
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In Roe, the Court stated: “In areas other than criminal abortion, 
the law has been reluctant to endorse any theory that life, as we 
recognize it, begins before live birth or to accord legal rights to the 
unborn except in narrowly defined situations and except when the 
rights are contingent upon live birth.”201 Whatever the accuracy of that 
statement at the time Roe was decided almost fifty years ago—and that 
is debatable, to say the least202—it has long ceased to be an accurate 
summary of the state of the law. 
Judicial and legislative developments in areas outside of abortion 
law have increasingly recognized that, with respect to an unborn child, 
neither live birth, viability, nor any other arbitrary stage of human 
development is a relevant factor in defining public wrongs (criminal 
law), redressing private injuries (tort law), or determining when life-
sustaining medical treatment may be withdrawn or withheld from a 
pregnant woman who is unable to make such decisions for herself 
(health care law).203 In light of these developments, the Court’s clinging 
to viability as the critical benchmark for assigning value to an unborn 
child’s life is outdated and insupportable. 
2. Criminal Law 
In a reform of the law that has largely taken place since Roe was 
decided, thirty-six states have enacted statutes defining the killing of 
an unborn child (outside the context of abortion) as a form of 
homicide. 204  The most common approach, the one that has been 
adopted in thirty of those thirty-six states, has been to make the killing 
of an unborn child a crime without regard to any arbitrary gestational 
age.205 These statutes treat the unborn child as a member of the human 
 
201. Roe, 410 U.S. at 161. 
202. See Hamilton v. Scott, 97 So. 3d 728, 743–44 (Ala. 2012) (Parker, J., 
concurring) (summarizing scholarly critiques of Roe’s misreading of the 
state of the law regarding unborn children at the time Roe was decided). 
203. See infra Part III.3.B–D. 
204. Paul Benjamin Linton, The Legal Status of the Unborn Child under State 
Law, 6 U. St. Thomas J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 141, 143 (2011).  
205. See id. at 144 n.21 (listing statutes from Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, 
Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, 
Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin); see also Ark. Code § 5-1-
102(13)(B)(i)(a), (b) (2019) (extending scope of homicide statutes); Fla. 
Stat. § 775.021(5) (2019) (defining another as used in homicide statutes); id. 
§ 782.071 (vehicular homicide); id. § 782.09 (killing of an unborn child by 
injury to the mother); Ind. Code §§ 35-42-1-1(4), -3(a)(1), -4(a), -4(c) 
(2019) (murder, voluntary, and involuntary manslaughter); N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 14-23.1–.8 (2019) (all forms of homicide); Va. Code § 18.2-32.2 
(2019) (killing a fetus). Many of the states that have enacted fetal-
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family whose life is entitled to protection by the criminal law through–
out the child’s development in utero.206 Of the remaining states that do 
set a gestational age limit, only one sets it at viability.207 The others 
place it at “quickening”208 or some other point before viability.209 
Of the twenty-nine states that have retained capital punishment 
for the crime of murder, at least twenty-two of them prohibit by statute 
the execution of a woman while she is pregnant,210 regardless of the 
stage of her pregnancy. Thus, these states recognize that innocent 
human life should not be taken in the course of inflicting the death 
penalty upon the guilty. In such cases, the death sentence is suspended 
until the woman is no longer pregnant.211 
3. Tort Law 
The courts of thirty states have expressly or impliedly rejected 
viability as a relevant factor in determining liability for causing non-
fatal, prenatal injuries to an unborn child. They have held that a 
common law action to recover damages for such injuries may be brought 
 
homicide statutes have also criminalized conduct that results in non-fatal 
injuries to unborn children. 
206. Both state and federal courts have uniformly rejected state and federal 
constitutional challenges to these statutes, including the argument that 
they violate Roe v. Wade. See Linton, supra note 204, at 145 nn.22–24, 
16 nn.25–26.  
207. Md. Code., Crim. Law § 2-103 (2019) (murder or manslaughter). 
208. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.210 (2019) (manslaughter); Wash. Rev. Code § 
9A.32.060(1)(b) (2019) (manslaughter). “Quickening” refers to the stage of 
pregnancy when the woman first detects fetal movement. See Dorland’s 
Illustrated Medical Dictionary, supra note 43. 
209. People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591, 599 (Cal. 1994) (construing the term fetus, 
as used in Cal. Penal Code § 187(a) (2019), to mean “post-embryonic,” 
i.e., seven to eight weeks gestation); Mont. Code §§ 45-5-102(1)(c), -
103(1) (2019) (homicide of the fetus, deliberate and mitigated); id. § 45-
5-116(3) (defining fetus as “an organism of the species homo sapiens from 
8 weeks of development until complete expulsion or extraction from a 
woman’s body”); N.H. Rev. Stat. §§ 630:1-a(IV)–(V), :1-b, :2–:3 (2019) 
(all forms of homicide and defining fetus to mean post-twenty weeks 
gestation). 
210. Linton, supra note 204, at 146 n.27 (listing statutes from Alabama, 
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming). 
Since Legal Status was published, Maryland, which once prohibited the 
execution of a pregnant woman, repealed its death penalty. See Md. 
Code, art. 27 §§ 71–79 (repealed 1999). Statutes prohibiting the execution 
of pregnant women merely codified the common law rule. 
211. Linton, supra note 204, at 146. 
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without regard to the stage of pregnancy when they were inflicted.212 
Courts in seventeen other states recognize a cause of action for prenatal 
injuries sustained after viability,213 but those courts have not yet had 
occasion to decide whether such an action will lie for injuries suffered 
before viability. Significantly, no state court has rejected a cause of 
action for prenatal injuries, regardless of the gestational age of the 
unborn child, in fifty years.214 
A representative example of the judicial reasoning for rejecting a 
viability requirement as a condition of recovery for prenatal injuries is 
the New Jersey Supreme Court’s pre-Roe decision in Smith v. 
Brennan.215 There the court stated: 
 
[T]he viability distinction has no relevance to the injustice of 
denying recovery for harm which can be proved to have resulted 
from the wrongful act of another. Whether viable or not at the time 
of the injury, the child sustains the same harm after birth, and 
therefore should be given the same opportunity for redress.216 
 
Forty-three states, by court interpretation or by statute, now allow 
recovery under wrongful death statutes for prenatal injuries resulting 
in stillbirth.217 Some states, out of a reluctance to expand by judicial 
 
212. Id. at 147 n.29 (listing cases from Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia, Washington, 
West Virginia, and Wisconsin). See generally Roland F. Chase, Annotation, 
Liability for Prenatal Injuries, 40 A.L.R.3d 1222 (1971 & Supp. 2018) 
(collecting cases). 
213. Linton, supra note 204, at 148 n.30 (listing cases from Arkansas, 
Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota, Mississippi, 
Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, South 
Carolina, Utah, and Vermont). There are no reported cases recognizing 
or denying a cause of action for prenatal injuries from Alaska, Maine, or 
Wyoming. See id. at 148.  
214. The last two state courts to reject such a cause of action were Michigan, 
see Marlow v. Krapek, 174 N.W.2d 172 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969), and 
Virginia, see Lawrence v. Craven Tire Co., 169 S.E.2d 440 (Va. 1969). 
215. 157 A.2d 497 (N.J. 1960). 
216. Id. at 504; see also Sinkler v. Kneale, 164 A.2d 93, 96 (Pa. 1960) (whether 
an unborn child was viable when the injuries were sustained “[has] little 
to do with the basic right to recover, when the [fetus] is regarded as having 
existence as a separate creature from the moment of conception”). 
217. Linton, supra note 204, at 148 n.32 (listing cases and statutes from 
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, 
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, 
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decision the scope of a cause of action unknown at common law, allow 
the action to be brought only if the unborn child was viable at the time 
of the injury causing the child’s death (or at least by the time death 
occurred).218 But the modern trend, supported by legislative reform, is 
toward abolishing any viability (or other gestational) requirement.219 
 
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North 
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South 
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, 
West Virginia, and Wisconsin); see also Alaska Code §§ 09.55.585, 
11.81.900(b)(64) (2019) (defining unborn child); Ind. Code § 34-23-2.1 
(2019); Va. Code §§ 8.01-50(B), 32.1-249 (2019) (defining fetal death). 
The Hawaii Court of Appeals has confirmed an earlier federal court 
opinion interpreting Hawaii’s wrongful death statute to permit an action 
on behalf of a viable, stillborn child. See Castro v. Melchor, 366 P.3d 
1058, 1065–70 (Haw. Ct. App. 2016). Six states do not recognize a cause 
of action for the wrongful death of a stillborn child. See Linton, supra 
note 204, at 150 n.37 (citing cases from California, Florida, Iowa, Maine, 
New Jersey, and New York). One state, Wyoming, has not yet decided 
whether a wrongful death action will lie for prenatal injuries resulting in 
stillbirth. See id. at 150 n.38. See generally Sheldon R. Shapiro, 
Annotation, Right to Maintain or to Recover Damages for Death of 
Unborn Child, 84 A.L.R.3d 411 (1978 & Supp. 2018) (collecting cases).  
218. Thirteen states have, by court decision, denied recovery (for stillbirth) 
when both the injury and stillbirth occur before viability. See Linton, 
supra note 204, at 150 & n.36 (listing cases from Arizona, Idaho, 
Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, New Hampshire, New 
Mexico, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and 
Washington). One other state has adopted a viability rule by statute. See 
Ind. Code § 34-23-2.1 (2019). Two other states allow recovery when the 
injury causing stillbirth occurs after “quickening.” See Porter v. Lassiter, 
87 S.E.2d 100, 103 (Ga. Ct. App. 1955); Rainey v. Horn, 72 So. 2d 434, 
439–40 (Miss. 1954) (since codified at Miss. Code § 11-7-13 (2019)). It 
should be noted that allowing wrongful death actions to be brought on 
behalf of viable unborn children who were stillborn represented an initial, 
first step in extending liability from the previous rule that had denied all 
recovery in such cases. As this Article demonstrates, however, it was only 
a first step. 
219. Fifteen states now allow recovery for the wrongful death of a stillborn 
child regardless of the stage of pregnancy when the injury and death occur. 
See Linton, supra note 204, at 149 n.34 (listing cases and statutes from 
Alabama, Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma, 
South Dakota, Utah, Texas, and West Virginia); see also Alaska Code 
§§ 09.55.585, 11.81.900(b)(64) (2019) (defining unborn child); Ark. Code 
§§ 16-62-102, 5-1-102(13)(B)(i) (b) (2019) (same); Kan. Stat. § 60-1901 
(2019); Va. Code §§ 8.01-50(B), 32.1-249 (2019) (collectively defining 
fetal death). Twelve other states have not had occasion to decide whether 
a wrongful death action will lie for the death of an unborn child where 
both the injury and the subsequent stillbirth occur before viability. See 
Linton, supra note 204, at 148 n.32 (listing cases from Colorado, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Minnesota, Nevada, North Carolina, 
North Dakota, Ohio, Tennessee, Vermont, and Wisconsin). 
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For example, in explaining its decision to abandon viability as a 
requirement that must be met in the case of wrongful death actions 
brought on behalf of stillborn children, the Alabama Supreme Court 
stated: 
[I]t is an unfair and arbitrary endeavor to draw a line that 
allows recovery on behalf of a fetus injured before viability 
that dies after achieving viability but that prevents recovery 
on behalf of an injured fetus that, as a result of those injuries, 
does not survive to viability. Moreover, it is an endeavor that 
unfairly distracts from the well established fundamental 
concerns of the State’s wrongful-death jurisprudence, i.e., 
whether there exists a duty of care and the punishment of the 
wrongdoer who breaches that duty. We cannot conclude that 
“logic, fairness, and justice” compel the drawing of such a line; 
instead, “logic, fairness, and justice” compel the application of 
the Wrongful Death Act to circumstances where prenatal 
injuries have caused death to a fetus before the fetus has 
achieved the ability to live outside the womb.220  
And when prenatal injuries result in death after live birth, the 
weight of modern authority rejects any requirement that an injury 
occur after viability (or any other stage of development) as a condition 
of recovery under wrongful death statutes.221 Thus, both with respect 
to wrongful death actions based upon an injury that causes stillbirth, 
as well as wrongful death actions based upon an injury that causes 
death after live birth, state legislatures and state courts have 
increasingly rejected viability as an appropriate benchmark for 
determining liability. 
4. Health Care Law 
At the time Roe was decided, there were few, if any, statutes 
authorizing competent adults to execute advance directives setting 
forth what health care they wished to receive in the event that they are 
no longer able to make those decisions for themselves. Presently, all 
states have such statutes. Almost two-thirds of them prohibit the 
withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from a pregnant 
woman patient under the authority of an advance directive.222 And with 
 
220. Mack v. Carmack, 79 So. 3d 597, 611 (Ala. 2011). 
221. See Linton, supra note 204, at 149 n.35 (citing cases from Connecticut, 
Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Virginia). 
222. Id. at 152 n.42 (citing statutes from Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, and 
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the exceptions of Colorado and Louisiana, whether a woman’s unborn 
child is viable has no bearing on whether such treatment may be 
withheld or withdrawn.223 Thus, in yet another area of law, the lives of 
unborn children are generally protected throughout pregnancy. 
5. Summary  
Whatever may have been the state of the law at the time Roe was 
decided with respect to the status of the unborn child in areas other 
than abortion, it is abundantly clear that drastic changes in broad areas 
of the law have taken place since then. The overwhelming majority of 
states now recognize the unborn child as a human being whose rights 
are protected without regard to whether the child has attained some 
arbitrary stage of development such as quickening or viability. 224 
Indeed, outside the context of abortion, the concept of viability has 
little or no relevance in determining whether an unborn child is 
protected in criminal law, tort law, or health care law. 
The Court has continued to rely on viability as the critical 
component of its abortion jurisprudence to justify its continued 
adherence to Roe. That reliance, however, ignores how increasingly 
irrelevant the concept of viability has become with respect to the legal 
status of unborn children in areas of law outside of abortion. In light of 
these developments, contrary to the Joint Opinion, “the law’s growth 
in the intervening years has left Roe’s central [viability] rule a doctrinal 
anachronism discounted by society.”225 
 
Wisconsin); see also Colo. Rev. Stat. § 15-18-104(2) (2019); La. Rev. 
Stat. § 40.1151.9(E) (2019). The restrictions in Idaho, Nevada, and South 
Carolina’s laws now appear, respectively, at Idaho Code § 39-4510(1) 
(2019), Nev. Rev. Stat. § 449A.451 (2019), and S.C. Code § 62-5-507 
(2019) (with respect to durable powers of attorney for health care). The 
Florida, Georgia, and Oklahoma statutes allow life-sustaining care to be 
withdrawn or withheld from pregnant patients only if expressly authorized 
in the patient’s advance directive. 
223. In Colorado, life-sustaining treatment may not be withheld or withdrawn 
from a pregnant woman if her unborn child is determined to be viable. 
See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 15-18-104(2) (2019). In Louisiana, it may not 
be withheld or withdrawn if the child has attained a post-fertilization age 
of twenty or more weeks. See La. Rev. Stat. § 40.1151.9(E) (2019). 
224. See Ex parte Phillips, No. 1160403, 2018 WL 5095002, at *61 (Ala. Oct. 
19, 2018) (Parker, J., concurring) (“[I]t is apparent that the laws of this 
nation increasingly recognize unborn children as persons entitled to the 
protections of the law, except where prohibited by the Roe exception.”). 
225. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833, 855 (1992) (emphasis added). 
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D. Changes of Fact 
The fourth stare decisis factor identified in Casey is “whether facts 
have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed 
the old rule [that a pregnant woman has a right to obtain an abortion 
for any reason before viability] of significant application or justifi–
cation.”226 In its analysis of this factor, the Joint Opinion stated:  
[V]iability marks the earliest point at which the State’s interest 
in fetal life is constitutionally adequate to justify a legislative ban 
on nontherapeutic abortions[, regardless of whether] viability 
occurs at approximately 28 weeks, as was usual at the time of 
Roe, at 23 to 24 weeks, as it sometimes does today, or at some 
moment even slightly earlier in pregnancy, as it may if fetal 
respiratory capacity can somehow be enhanced in the future.227  
Accordingly, “the attainment of viability may continue to serve as the 
critical fact, . . . which is to say that no change in Roe’s factual 
underpinning has left its central holding obsolete, and none supports an 
argument for overruling it.”228 
In his partial dissent in Casey, Chief Justice Rehnquist dismissed 
this factor as of no consequence, commenting that “what might be 
called the basic facts which gave rise to Roe have remained the same—
women become pregnant, there is a point somewhere, depending upon 
medical technology, where a fetus becomes viable, and women give birth 
to children.” 229  That “the same facts which gave rise to Roe will 
continue to give rise to similar cases . . . . is not a reason, in and of 
itself, why those cases must be decided in the same incorrect manner 
as was the first case to deal with the question.”230 
But Chief Justice Rehnquist’s comment overlooks the real reason 
the Court even mentioned changes of fact as a factor in its stare decisis 
analysis. The one-paragraph discussion of changes of fact in Part 
III(A)(4) of the Joint Opinion is key to the development of the theme 
in III(B) that suggests that only changes of fact (or perceived fact) 
justify overruling an earlier precedent in cases of great national 
controversies.231 According to the Court, there have been no changes of 
relevant fact since 1973 (other than viability occurring somewhat earlier 
 
226. Id. 
227. Id. at 860. 
228. Id. 
229. Id. at 955 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
230. Id. 
231. See id. at 861–64 (joint opinion). 
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in pregnancy and abortion becoming safer later in pregnancy). 
Therefore, overruling Roe would be inappropriate.232 
1. Evidence of “Changes of Fact” is Not a Prerequisite to Reconsidering 
a Precedent 
In support of its conclusion that Roe should not be overruled 
because the underlying facts relating to viability have not changed, the 
Court, oddly, cited two landmark decisions of the Supreme Court in 
which it overruled prior precedents. 233  West Coast Hotel Co. v. 
Parrish 234  overruled (by implication) Lochner v. New York, 235  and 
Brown v. Board of Education 236  overruled (expressly) Plessy v. 
Ferguson.237 The thrust of the Joint Opinion is that the Court overruled 
Lochner and Plessy only because of the discovery of new “facts” in the 
interim. In the case of Lochner, the “new facts” were that laissez-faire 
economics does not work, and, in the case of Plessy, that racial 
segregation adversely affects the mental health of school children who 
are subjected to discrimination.238 As Chief Justice Rehnquist said in 
his partial dissent, “[t]his is at best a feebly supported, post hoc 
rationalization for those decisions.”239 
It is true that in West Coast Hotel the Court referred to “recent 
economic experience” and the Great Depression,240 but this was only in 
the last paragraph of the majority opinion.241 Most decidedly, West 
Coast Hotel “did not state that Lochner had been based on an economic 
view that had fallen into disfavor, and that it therefore should be 
overruled.”242 Rather, as Chief Justice Rehnquist observed in Casey, 
Chief Justice Hughes’s West Coast Hotel opinion “simply recognized 
what Justice Holmes had previously recognized in his Lochner dissent, 
that ‘[t]he Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract.’”243 
 
232. Id. at 864. 
233. See id. at 861–63.  
234. 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
235. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
236. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
237. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
238. Casey, 505 U.S. at 862–63. 
239. Id. at 960 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
240. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937). 
241. For the Court’s analysis of the “freedom of contract” issue, see id. at 391–
99. 
242. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 961 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (emphasis added). 
243. Id. (quoting West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 391) (alteration in original). 
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It is also true that in Brown the Court discussed the psychological 
impact of racial segregation upon minorities, 244  but so did Justice 
Harlan in his Plessy dissent.245 The Court’s actual holding in Brown was 
that the Equal Protection Clause forbids racial segregation, regardless 
of the public’s view of segregation or integration.246 The Court cited and 
relied upon cases decided shortly after the Reconstruction Amendments 
were ratified, interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment “as proscribing 
all state imposed discrimination against the Negro race.”247 And cases 
decided subsequent to Brown left little doubt that Brown was based on 
the perfectly straightforward proposition that racial segregation is 
unconstitutional per se, not due to any newly discovered insight into 
the psychological impact of racial discrimination on school-age 
children.248 As Robert Bork noted: “Racial segregation by order of the 
state was unconstitutional under all circumstances and had nothing to 
do with the context of education or the psychological vulnerability of a 
particular age group.”249 
In light of the foregoing, it is not accurate to state, as the Joint 
Opinion did, that “West Coast Hotel and Brown each rested on facts, 
 
244. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492–94, 494 nn.10–11 (1954). 
245. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 573, 562 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) 
(describing the “brand of servitude and degradation” placed upon African 
Americans as a result of segregation). 
246. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. 
247. Id. at 490 n.5. 
248. That Brown did not ultimately turn on the emotional effect of “separate 
but equal” educational facilities upon impressionable school-age children 
is evidenced by the Court’s post-Brown decisions invalidating segregated 
public beaches, golf courses, public parks, and courtrooms. Mayor & City 
Council of Balt. v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per curiam) (beaches); 
Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam) (golf courses); New 
Orleans City Park Improvement Ass’n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (per 
curiam) (parks), aff’g 252 F.2d 122, 123 (5th Cir. 1958) (rejecting the city’s 
request to remand the case “to determine whether such psychological 
considerations [that were present in Brown] are present in the denial of 
access” to public parks); Johnson v. Virginia, 383 U.S. 61, 62 (1973) (per 
curiam) (courtrooms; stating that “it is no longer open to question that a 
State may not constitutionally require segregation of public facilities”). 
249. Robert Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political 
Seduction of the Law 76 (1990); see also Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 962–63 (1992) 
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The rule of 
Brown is not tied to popular opinion about the evils of segregation; it is 
a judgment that the Equal Protection Clause does not permit racial 
segregation, no matter whether the public might come to believe that it 
is beneficial. On that ground it stands, and on that ground alone the 
Court was justified in properly concluding that the Plessy Court had 
erred.”). 
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or an understanding of facts, changed from those which furnished the 
claimed justifications for the earlier constitutional resolutions.”250 The 
errors of both Lochner and Plessy were thoroughly identified in the 
dissents in both cases.251 Although changes of fact may be cited in 
support of a departure from precedent,252 there is no legal principle that 
requires proof of such a change before an earlier precedent may be 
reconsidered (and the Joint Opinion cited none). Accordingly, in 
evaluating whether Roe should be overruled, it is not necessary to 
demonstrate that “Roe’s premises of fact have so far changed . . . as to 
render its central holding somehow irrelevant or unjustifiable in dealing 
with the issue it addressed.”253 
2. Significant Changes in Medical Technology Have Greatly Enhanced 
Our Understanding of Unborn Human Life 
Although changes of fact are not necessary in determining whether 
a case involving a “national controversy” may be overruled, changes of 
fact that undermine the very foundations upon which the prior decision 
was based do support overruling such a decision. As set forth below, 
there have been many changes of fact surrounding the medical 
treatment of unborn children. These changes demonstrate that the Roe 
Court seriously misperceived the true nature of the unborn child and, 
based on this misperception, grossly undervalued the State’s interest in 
protecting prenatal life. 
In Roe, the Court repeatedly referred to the State’s interest as an 
interest in protecting “potential life,” as though there were no actual 
life in the womb.254 Given the state of obstetrical practice at the time, 
it is perhaps conceivable that the Court did not understand that the 
unborn child is actually alive—in a biological sense—prior to viability. 
Significant changes in medical technology since Roe was decided, 
however, clearly demonstrate that the unborn child within the womb is 
actually and, not just potentially, alive. 
At the time of Roe, obstetrical practice focused primarily on the 
pregnant woman, not on the unborn child. As one medical text 
described this past practice: “The mother was the patient to be cared 
 
250. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 863. 
251. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 557, 562 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting); 
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 73 (1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting); id. 
at 75–76 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
252. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S.Ct. 2080, 2096–97, 2099 
(2018) (overruling National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue 
of Illinois, 386 U.S. 753 (1967), and Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 
298 (1992), and rejecting the “physical presence rule” as a condition of 
imposing state sales taxes). 
253. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 855. 
254. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150, 159, 162, 163, 165 (1973). 
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for; the fetus was but another, albeit transient, maternal organ.”255 But 
modern obstetrical medicine has rejected this outmoded view of unborn 
children. Indeed, an unborn child is now recognized as a “second 
patient, a patient who usually faces much greater risks of serious 
morbidity and mortality than does the mother.”256 And the unborn 
child can be treated surgically and medically while still in utero—both 
before and after viability.257 
Although ubiquitous now, basic ultrasound technology was in its 
infancy at the time of Roe and was not widely used in the United States 
until well into the 1970s.258 And the clarity of sonogram pictures is 
greatly enhanced today. Mothers regularly see and share photos taken 
of their unborn children during the first trimester of pregnancy and 
beyond. 
The advent of the prenatal obstetric ultrasound has given rise to 
whole new fields of medicine. Fetal surgery was unavailable at the time 
of Roe, but now top pediatric hospitals across the country regularly 
perform such surgeries.259 This can be done by partially extracting the 
 
255. F. Gary Cunningham et al., Williams Obstetrics 277 (18th ed. 
1989). An earlier version of this text also stated: 
Fetal diagnosis and therapy have now emerged as legitimate tools the 
obstetrician must possess. Moreover, the number of tools the 
obstetrician can employ to address the needs of the fetus increases 
each year . . . Who would have dreamed—even a few years ago—that 
we could serve the fetus as physician? Or, that the well-being and 
growth of the fetus could be monitored accurately and that the status 
of fetal health could be addressed? 
 Jack A. Pritchard & Paul C. MacDonald, Williams Obstetrics 
vii (16th ed. 1980). 
256. See Cunningham et al., supra note 255. 
257. See infra notes 259–262 and accompanying text.  
258. Malcolm Nicolson & John E.E. Fleming, Imaging and Imagining 
the Fetus 233 (2013) (“By . . . 1976, diagnostic ultrasound was 
established as a component of modern clinical routine.”); see also id. at 
201 (“[B]y the mid-1970s . . . the fetus had become a clinical presence in 
its own right, for the first time in its history.”). 
259. The website of Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia describes this emerging 
field as follows:  
Fetal surgery is a highly complex surgical intervention to repair birth 
defects in the womb that requires the most expert care for both mother 
and unborn baby. Improved fetal imaging and diagnostic tools have 
allowed us to identify more precisely when conditions worsen during 
fetal development. This knowledge has helped us develop new ways to 
help babies sooner while in utero. Today, fetal therapy is recognized 
as one of the most promising fields in pediatric medicine, and prenatal 
surgery is becoming an option for a growing number of babies with 
birth defects.  
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baby from the womb, performing surgery on it and then returning the 
baby to the womb to continue its development. And some fetal maladies 
are now remediable through less-invasive laparoscopy surgical 
procedures. 260  Likewise, other conditions that are potentially life-
threatening to an unborn child may be diagnosed in utero and treated 
by providing the mother with medicines to resolve these problems.261 
And newly emerging treatments for babies in utero include trans–
plantation of the mother’s stem cells to the baby to cure a variety of 
diseases.262 Moreover, obstetrical textbooks note that the failure to treat 
an unborn child as a second patient in modern obstetrical practice can 
result in significant legal liability for injuries to that child.263 
From the foregoing, it is clear that the prevailing view of unborn 
children has changed dramatically since Roe. They are now viewed as 
individual patients deserving of, and regularly provided with, medical 
care. This is due, in large measure, to advances in prenatal medicine, 
which were developed through the use of ultrasound technology that 
became available after Roe. 
Thus, even though changes of fact are not necessary in order to 
overrule a case involving a national controversy, when such changes do 
come about and make the “old facts” relied upon obsolete, they do 
support a reexamination of the prior case. This is especially true where, 
as here, the many breakthroughs in prenatal treatments since Roe can 
understandably cause significant cognitive dissonance in the public 
mind. It is now possible for two women at the same stage of pregnancy 
 
 Fetal Surgery, Children’s Hospital of Phila., https://www.chop.edu/ 
 treatments/fetal-surgery [https://perma.cc/B2VT-GW8Q] (last visited 
Oct. 29, 2019). 
260. Kathryn M. Maselli & Andrea Badillo, Advances in Fetal Surgery, 4 
Annals Translational Med. 394, 396–97 (2016), available at https:// 
 www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5107396/. 
261. See, e.g., John T. Harrigan et al., Successful Treatment of Fetal Congestive 
Heart Failure Secondary to Tachycardia, 304 New Eng. J. Med. 1527, 
1528 (1981) (describing the administration of digoxin to a mother to 
remedy cardiac arrhythmias in her unborn baby); see also supra notes 84–
86 and accompanying text. 
262. A recent article described a baby diagnosed with a fatal disease in utero 
who received some of his mother’s stem cells at about eighteen weeks 
gestational age and was later born at thirty-seven weeks. Suzanne Leigh, 
Baby Born in World’s First in utero Stem Cell Transplant Trial, U. Cal. 
S.F. (May 25, 2018), https://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/news/baby-
born-world-s-first-utero-stem-cell-transplant-trial [https://perma.cc/P6W8-
SWNF]. 
263. Cunningham et al., supra note 255. 
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to enter the same hospital—one to deliver prematurely or undergo 
prenatal surgery, while the other procures an elective abortion.264  
 It is not clear whether the Justices in the Roe majority actually 
believed that the unborn have only “potential,” and not actual, life. 
However, that was their stated justification for devaluing the unborn 
and limiting the State’s ability to protect the actual lives of the unborn. 
With the ever-expanding ability to treat the unborn child in utero, even 
before viability, and the legal liability now available for causing 
prenatal injuries, this justification for refusing to allow states to protect 
these actual children throughout pregnancy cannot be supported. Thus, 
contrary to the Joint Opinion, the “decision to reexamine [Roe] on this 
ground alone [is] not only justified, but required.”265 
IV. Does Viability Matter? 
Apart from the foregoing analysis of the stare decisis factors 
considered in Casey, it may be asked: Does viability even matter? That 
is, does the unborn child’s attainment of viability, however difficult that 
may be to determine, make any actual difference in the State’s 
authority to prohibit a pregnant woman from obtaining an abortion? 
The answer would appear to be “no,” which suggests that the viability 
rule reaffirmed in Casey is an illusory distinction without legal or 
practical significance. 
In Roe, the Court held that after viability, “the State in promoting 
its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, 
and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate 
medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the 
mother.”266 In the companion case of Doe v. Bolton,267 the Court, relying 
upon its earlier opinion in United States v. Vuitch,268 defined the scope 
of the mandated health exception: “[T]he medical judgment [as to the 
necessity of an abortion] may be exercised in the light of all factors—
physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman’s age—
relevant to the well-being of the patient. All these factors may relate to 
 
264. A graphic description of the dilation-and-evacuation abortion method (“D 
& E”), which is the most commonly used method during the second 
trimester, may be found in Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 135–36 
(2007). 
265. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833, 863 (1992). 
266. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1973) (emphases added). 
267. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
268. 402 U.S. 62 (1971). 
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health.”269 Given this expansive definition of health, it is doubtful that 
any statute attempting to limit post-viability abortions would be 
constitutional. And the post-Roe case law does nothing to dispel this 
doubt. 
In Doe v. Rampton,270 a three-judge federal district court struck 
down a Utah statute that prohibited post-viability abortions unless the 
procedure was “necessary to save the life of the pregnant woman or to 
prevent serious and permanent damage to her physical health.”271 It did 
so, in part, because “it prohibit[ed] abortions performed to preserve the 
mental health of the mother.”272 In Margaret S. v. Edwards,273 a federal 
district court struck down a Louisiana statute prohibiting abortion after 
viability unless the procedure was necessary “to prevent permanent 
impairment to [the woman’s] health.”274 The court reasoned:  
Preserving maternal health means more than preventing 
permanent incapacity. A rape or incest victim may not be able to 
prove that her mental health will be permanently impaired if she 
is forced to bear her attacker’s child, but she might be able to 
show that it is necessary to preserve her immediate mental 
health.275  
In Schulte v. Douglas,276 a federal district court considered the 
constitutionality of a Nebraska statute that prohibited abortion after 
viability unless the procedure was “necessary to preserve the woman 
from an imminent peril that substantially endangers her life or 
health.”277 It held that the qualifying words “imminent” and “sub–
stantial” impermissibly narrowed the scope of post-viability abortions 
that must be permitted under Roe.278 In Planned Parenthood of Central 
New Jersey v. Verniero, 279  a federal district court reviewed the 
 
269. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 192 (emphasis added). In Roe, the Court emphasized 
that Roe and Bolton “are to be read together.” Roe, 410 U.S. at 165. 
270. 366 F. Supp. 189 (D. Utah 1973). 
271. Id. app. at 194 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-302(3) (amended 1973)). 
272. Id. at 192–93. 
273. 488 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. La. 1980). 
274. Id. at 196 (quoting La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:1299.35.4 (1979). 
275. Id. It should be noted that no plaintiff in Edwards was a victim of rape 
or incest. 
276. 567 F. Supp. 522 (D. Neb. 1981), aff’d per curiam sub nom. Women’s 
Services, P.C. v. Douglas, 710 F.2d 465 (8th Cir. 1983). 
277. Id. at 525 (quoting Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 28-329, -330 (1979)). 
278. Id. 
279. 41 F. Supp. 2d 478 (D. N.J. 1998), aff’d, 220 F.3d 127 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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constitutionality of a prohibition on partial-birth abortions that 
contained an exception only for a woman’s life. The court held that 
“states may not proscribe an abortion procedure, before or after 
viability, without providing an exception for when such procedure is 
necessary, in a physician’s medical judgment, to preserve the physical 
or mental health of the woman.”280 
In Women’s Medical Professional Corp. v. Voinovich,281 the Sixth 
Circuit affirmed a district court judgment striking down an Ohio 
statute that prohibited post-viability abortions except when the 
procedure was necessary to avert the death of the pregnant woman or 
to avoid serious risk of substantial and irreversible impairment of a 
major bodily function.282 The court of appeals noted that the statute 
“appear[ed] to be limited to physical health risks, as opposed to mental 
health risks.”283 This understanding was confirmed by the State in oral 
argument and the legislative intent set forth in the statute. 284  So 
construed, the Sixth Circuit held the statute unconstitutional. The 
court explained that “if the State chooses to proscribe post-viability 
abortions, it must provide a health exception that includes situations 
where a woman is faced with the risk of severe psychological or 
emotional injury which may be irreversible.”285 In American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists v. Thornburgh,286 the Third Circuit 
noted that “no Supreme Court case has upheld a criminal statute 
prohibiting abortion of a viable fetus.”287 The court stated, in dicta, 
that had Pennsylvania attempted to prohibit post-viability abortions 
performed for psychological or emotional reasons, such a limitation 
would have been unconstitutional under Doe v. Bolton.288 In Jane L. v. 
 
280. Id. at 502. 
281. 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997).  
282. Id. at 190. 
283. Id. at 206. 
284. Id. at 206–07. 
285. Id. at 210. 
286. 737 F.2d 283 (3d Cir. 1984). 
287. Id. at 298.  
288. Id. at 299. The inherent manipulability of a mental health exception is 
evident from the pre-Roe experience with California’s Therapeutic Abortion 
Act of 1967. According to data referenced by the California Supreme 
Court, more than 60,000 abortions were authorized and performed in 1970 
for alleged “mental health” reasons, even though the standard for invoking 
the exception was the same as the standard for civil commitment, to wit, 
the pregnant woman had to pose a danger to herself or to others or to the 
property of others. See People v. Barksdale, 503 P.2d 257, 264–65 (Cal. 
1972). The court went on to express “serious doubt” that more than 
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Bangerter,289 the Tenth Circuit, also in dicta, opined that a restriction 
of post-viability abortions to those necessary to prevent “grave damage 
to the woman’s health” would violate Roe and Casey.290 
In light of the unanimity of the foregoing authorities, it is apparent 
that the states may not restrict post-viability abortions to those 
necessary to preserve the physical health of the woman. It is even 
doubtful that they could impose any enforceable limitations on 
abortions sought for reasons of the woman’s mental health.291 And the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to grant review in cases in which 
it could have clarified the scope of the post-viability health exception 
mandated by Roe.292 If, as these lower court decisions suggest, the states 
have little or no authority to impose meaningful limitations on post-
viability abortions, then the viability rule adopted in Roe and re–
affirmed in Casey would appear to be meaningless. 
Conclusion 
Roe and its progeny have been subjected to severe and sustained 
scholarly criticism, which has not abated since Roe was decided almost 
fifty years ago. Those critiques have shown that Roe was so 
fundamentally flawed that the decision provides almost limitless targets 
for scholarly attack.  
One wonders whether the authors of Casey’s Joint Opinion (none 
of whom was on the Court when Roe was decided) knew what was 
contained in Justice Blackmun’s private papers concerning Roe and the 
choice of viability. Regardless, those papers laid bare the vacuity of it 
all. There was no careful examination of what the Joint Opinion 
repeatedly called the “essential” holding of Roe—the viability rule. Nor 
was there any reasoned explanation for that choice. Rather, the choice 
of viability was purely arbitrary and unnecessary, no more than an 
 
60,000 women met the standard for civil commitment merely because they 
were pregnant. Id. at 265. 
289. 102 F.3d 1112 (10th Cir. 1996). 
290. Id. at 1118 n.7. In Jane L., the court of appeals held that the post-viability 
applications of a twenty-week abortion ban could not be severed from the 
pre-viability applications of the ban and struck down the ban in toto. Id. 
at 1117. 
291. The authors are unaware of any case in which a physician has been 
successfully prosecuted for performing a post-viability abortion in violation of 
a state law prohibiting such abortions. 
292. See, e.g., Guam Soc’y of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Ada, 962 F.2d 
1366 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1011 (1992); Jane L., 102 F.3d 
1112, cert. denied sub nom. Leavitt v. Jane L., 520 U.S. 1274 (1997); 
Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997), 
cert. denied 523 U.S. 1036 (1998). 
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afterthought. It was, as Justice White said at the time, the “exercise of 
raw judicial power.”293 
Not one of the stare decisis factors identified in Casey purporting 
to require adherence to the viability rule precludes reconsideration of 
Roe. Indeed, all of them strongly favor a decision overruling Roe. The 
viability rule is unworkable because it is incapable of being applied and 
enforced in a principled, consistent fashion; there is no plausible 
personal or societal reliance that can be placed on continued access to 
legal abortion through viability; the law has increasingly discarded 
viability as an outmoded relic of legal analysis; and medical and 
scientific developments since Roe have dramatically changed society’s 
perception of the unborn child, both before and after viability. 
It is almost certain that another case will reach the Supreme Court 
in which a state will argue that Roe should be overruled. When that 
happens, the Court should not hesitate to re-examine and overrule Roe. 
As Justice White remarked in his Thornburgh dissent, “history has been 
far kinder to those who departed from precedent[, as in Brown,] than 
to those who would have blindly followed the rule of stare decisis.”294 
Roe has distorted “the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence”295 long 
enough, and the Court should restore to the states their rightful 




293. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 222 (1973) (White, J., dissenting).  
294. Thornburg v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 
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